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Chapter 1 explores a potential solution to the continuing disequlibrium in microfinance markets.  
I design a mechanism to aid in securitization of microloans, using a dynamic investment pool 
governed by a Central Microcredit Clearinghouse (CMC), that would sell investment units back 
to MFIs and outside investors simultaneously.  The CMC would serve as a catalyst to this other 
avenue of microcredit financing, securitization of microloans, which could help spawn the type 
of growth in investor-based funding of MFIs that is so urgently needed.  Chapter 2 analyzes 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitment and disbursement activity in terms of 
motivation, considering that the difference between bilateral aid commitments and disbursements 
may be related to the business cycle of the donor country.  The annual disbursement gap is 
calculated for each pair for each year, as well as a cumulative disbursement gap, and these are 
regressed against multiple cyclicality measures of income and a set of control variables.  It is 
found in multiple specifications that the cumulative disbursement gap is generally procyclical, 
much as aid itself, although the cyclicality of aid depends on the cyclicality measure.  This is 
confirmed with four extensions designed mainly as robustness checks.  Chapter 3 uses both the 
round six and 2006-2008 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) data for both male and 
female respondents along with macroeconomic data over the same time period to test a number 
of theoretical questions regarding changes in relationship exit costs and their effects on behavior 
in cohabitation, marriage, and separation.  I find that our proxy for cohabitation surplus and exit 
costs significantly affects subsequent decisions of cohabitation, marriage, separation, and 
divorce.  Also, marriage hazard rates are related to these changing exit costs in ways consistent 
with recent advances in theory.    
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The Central Microcredit Clearinghouse:  




As Microfinance Organizations (MFIs) gain commercial viability, the prospect of international 
capital markets' participation in assisting MFIs to meet the worldwide demand for services holds 
much promise, especially in the area of microcredit.  Prior analyses support the use of 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) for bundling diversified loans to MFIs together to be 
repackaged as rated investments.  In this paper, I design a mechanism to aid in securitization of 
microloans, using a dynamic investment pool governed by a Central Microcredit Clearinghouse 
(CMC), that would sell investment units back to MFIs and outside investors simultaneously.  The 
CMC would serve as a catalyst to this other avenue of microcredit financing, securitization of 
microloans, which could help spawn the type of growth in investor-based funding of MFIs that is 
so urgently needed.  Finally, I present a simulation of growth of microlending in South Asia, if a 





The microcredit industry, the largest component of microfinance services, is expanding in 
volume, and close to reaching commercial viability.  What started as a charitable mission 
decades ago is moving from the purview of NGOs to the interested eyes of profit-seeking 
investors.  Recent years have seen rapid growth in micro-lending, advancing from an estimated 
$4 billion market in 2001 to around $25 billion in 2006 (Dieckmann, 2007).  Today, it is 
estimated that over 100 million micro-borrowers in more than 85 countries are being served by 
10,000 microfinance institutions (MFIs) (Galema & Lensick, 2009).  These institutions 
collectively self-report a gross loan portfolio of over $60 billion today (The Mix).   
 
Despite this rapid growth of funds available to micro-borrowers, only around 4% of the total 
demand for microloans is being met (Wardle, 2005; CGAP, 2006; Swanson, 2007; Byström, 
2008; World Bank).  It has been estimated that 1 to 1.5 billion potential micro-borrowers 
collectively seek to borrow between $300 billion and $500 billion.  The market appears to be in 
disequilibrium, exhibiting significant and persistent excess demand (Dieckmann, 2007).  If the 
microfinance industry is to meet this demand, it must undergo significant adjustments, one of 
which is increased access for MFIs to market-based funding sources.   
 
The benefits of microfinance have been subject to significant analysis and scrutiny.  Prior 
research suggests that microcredit may not be a solution for impoverished individuals to lift 
themselves out of poverty, since not every impoverished person possesses sufficient education or 
entrepreneurial talent to create a successful enterprise.  Another challenge to the effectiveness of 
microlending is the ultimate use of funds.  There is evidence that even with the thus far restricted 
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access to microloans, some borrow for consumption smoothing, instead of income generating 
activities (CGAP, 2010; Amendariz, 2000).   
 
However, it is most common for a micro-borrower to use funds in some domestic enterprise, 
where the project return exceeds the interest cost of the loan, providing the borrower with an 
income stream (Morduch, 1999).  There is substantial evidence of microcredit's success in 
alleviating poverty.  There is also substantial evidence that many MFIs are able to hold defaults 
to a sufficiently low portion of their loanable funds, keeping them operationally sustainable.  
These together suggest that it is fair to set aside the discussion of microcredit's efficacy, and 
continue on to the discussion of the development of microcredit markets.   
 
One question of particular importance to the development of the industry is whether potential 
funding sources for microloans are going unexplored.  Microcredit financing as a debt-based 
investment presents many challenges to be addressed before markets will adequately develop.  
While loans to Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) constitute a large portion of their collective 
working capital, another potentially lower-cost form of capital remains unavailable.  Microloan 
securitization has been briefly and recently attempted, but with poor results.  Weaknesses of a 
microloan securitization market are plentiful both from the point of view of the investor and of 
the MFI.   
 
For the investor, the lack of corporate governance in smaller MFIs, currency risk, country risk, 
non-standardization of accounting practices, and lack of institutional oversight all collude to 
provide risk that is most often uncompensated by the return potential.  For the MFI, the cost of 
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securitization is prohibitive (Pollinger & Outhwaite, 2007).  While such a market could provide a 
rich, new source of lower-cost funding for expansion of microlending to poor areas, the financial 
expertise required would be substantial.  Even more threatening is the combination of this cost 
with the term of the typical microloan.  Loans of just a few months are paid off almost as soon as 
they could be securitized, so that the expensive process would need to be repeated far more often 
than for mortgage-backed securities, for example.  The purpose of this paper is to propose a 
solution to some of these challenges, so that market funding can expand for those MFIs in 
position for survival, growth, and eventual market penetration.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Part 2 provides a survey of the current 
literature concerning funding sources and capital market access to MFIs, including the 
Microcredit Collateralized Debt Obligation (MiCDO) market, and the relative strengths of the 
main forms of capital market funding for MFIs.  Part 3 introduces a hypothetical organization 
called the Central Microcredit Clearinghouse (CMC), and discusses its purpose in facilitating 
securitization of microcredit loans, as well as its potential organization and operation.  Part 4 
then uses data available about South Asian MFIs to present a simple numerical example of how a 
South Asia Central Microcredit Clearinghouse (SACMC) might have assisted in development of 
regional MFIs to expand their services over a ten year span.  Part 5 concludes.   
 
1.2 Funding Microfinance Institutions 
The many microfinance institutions (MFIs) operating worldwide vary widely in their capital 
structure
1
.  The mission of microfinance as a means toward poverty alleviation appeals to a large 
                                                 
1
 Fehr & Hishigsuren (2004) provide a detailed listing of operational funding sources for MFIs.   
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group of individual and institutional donors.  Donations constitute a large share of operational 
dollars to many MFIs, as do government grants, and subsidized lending (Fehr & Hishigsuren, 
2004).  Although some MFIs are moving toward independent financial sustainability, for the 
industry of microfinance as a whole, donations and grants have been, and continue to be, a 
necessary support.   
 
Client deposits often constitute a significant percentage of total liabilities for financial firms 
(Hempel & Simonson, 1999), and many MFIs are choosing to go beyond microlending by 
allowing, and even sometimes mandating, savings accounts held by clients of microcredit.  
Dowla & Alamgir (2003) describe the evolution of savings instruments in Bangladesh, noting 
that, despite regulatory challenges, these savings instruments not only provide liquidity to the 
MFIs, but also grant some protection against defaults.  Of the more established MFIs in South 
Asia, for example, two-thirds report holding savings accounts of clients, which total an average 
of about 25% of assets (The Mix).   
 
A table of microfinancing evolution typical to MFIs is provided by Calvin (2001) and modified 
by Fehr & Hishigsuren (2004).  It shows the early MFI supported mainly by donations, savings 
of clients, and government grants.  Various forms of debt financing are sought by more mature 
MFIs, and in the final stages, equity financing becomes part of the balance sheet.  This equity is 
comprised of retained earnings, social-minded equity stakes, both private and institutional, and 
even commercial equity in the case of the strongest and most viable MFIs.   
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While donations and grants can get a young MFI into operation and sustain it for some time, few 
have reached the point of commercial viability where traditional equity investing is possible.  An 
intermediate funding source, and also the most widely used, is debt.  MFIs who have reached a 
certain point of stability as an ongoing concern are finding themselves eligible to secure funding 
in debt markets.  Debt financing is the main focus of this paper, and it can be further subdivided 
into classes of direct borrowing and intermediated (brokered) transactions.  Direct borrowing is 
straightforward; if an MFI can sometimes borrow from another financial institution for 
operational financing.  However, due to the small size of most MFIs, the high transactions costs 
facing lenders associated with funding at the individual level makes this impractical (Glaubitt et 
al., 2009).   
 
In contrast to direct loans, some borrowed funds are acquired indirectly, via intermediation 
through either packages of loans made to a group of MFIs, or securitization of microloans.  It is 
this second category of financing that is the focus of the rest of the paper.  The recent history, 
present status, and potential future realizations in the microcredit market is summarized by 
several authors (see, for example, Byström 2008).  In his work, Byström introduces the 
Microcredit Collateralized Debt Obligation (MiCDO), and argues for its use as a conduit through 
which MFIs and Wall Street investors can meet.  Such a rapid growth in total volume of 
microcredit worldwide has allowed MFIs to provide attractive opportunities to investors.  That 
is, markets for CDOs require a deep enough pool of underlying assets for diversification, for 
proper valuation, and for replenishment of matured securities.   
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As a semantic distinction, Galema & Lensink (2009) use "CDOs" to refer to pooled loans 
granted to MFIs, with resulting securities backed by the MFIs themselves, and "securitization" to 
refer to marketing of securities backed purely by specified microloans.  For the purposes of this 
discussion, I will follow this convention.  Microfinance Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(MiCDOs) will signify the group-MFI lending by investors via intermediaries, and 
"securitization" will signify either a direct microloan to investment security conversion, or a 
securitization of microloans performed by an intermediary.
2
   
 
Several authors foresee a growing and strengthening microcredit collateralized debt obligation 
(MiCDO) market (Byström 2008, Sundaresan 2008, Swanson 2007).
3
  In fact, loans of this type 
have already occurred in recent years.
4
  The Dexia microcredit fund was launched in 1998, 
aimed at the provision of financing to MFIs providing services to small businesses.  More 
recently, in 2004 the BlueOrchard Microfinance Securities I fund (BOMSI) was launched.  This 
was a new type of funding strategy for the field, loaning over $80 million directly to 14 MFIs, 
and the pooled debt was sold in Senior, Subordinated, and Equity tranches to investors (Swanson 
2007).  This is arguably the first real MiCDO, and its degree success will be of interest.  Many 
microcredit funds have been launched in the interim,
5
 allowing investors another indirect avenue 
                                                 
2
 MiCDO itself is a misnomer, since nothing is collateralized in MFI lending.  These loans are 
simply debenture loans granted to MFIs, and backed only by their own good faith.   
3
 News of MiCDO developments are important additions to any published work; the reader is 
referred to the MIX market (www.themix.org), the World Bank website, and other microfinance 
and microbanking bulletins for current information on what is summarized here.   
4
 ProFund was a specialized Microfinance Investment Vehicle (MIV) that started in 1995, raising 
$23 million in an effort to finance several Latin American MFIs.  For more on this, see 
Dieckmann (2007).  Some evolutionary details in this storyline leaves debate as to how we might 
define the true start of the MiCDO.   BOMS1 is considered by many to be the first.   
5
 As of the time of this writing, www.microcapital.org provides a listing of at least 27 funds that 
specialize in providing funding to microfinance institutions.   
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to funding micro-borrowers; providing liquidity to the organizations that loan to the 
impoverished.   
 
The operational sustainability of MFIs is necessary for this trend to continue.  As long as 
MiCDO investors are realizing a fair risk-adjusted return, MFIs may use this access to funds to 
continue operation and expand services.  It may be true that, in time, indirect MiCDO funding of 
MFIs will provide the needed capital for eventual market saturation.  Many look to this avenue 
as the predominant form of structured microfinance in the near future.   
 
Securitization has only been attempted in reduced form.  What was touted as the first and largest 
"microloan securitization" deal was really a "microloan purchase" (Swanson 2007).  SHARE 
Microfin Ltd. is the third largest MFI in India by microloan volume, with over 1,000 branches, 
specializing in microcredit loans to poor women across India.  In January 2004, $4.3 million of 
SHARE's microloan portfolio
6
 was purchased by ICICI Bank (Basu, 2004).  This was a direct 
transfer of receivables, and can be viewed as a securitization deal where ICICI Bank retained all 
shares.  ICICI Bank is India's largest commercial bank, and the deal was guaranteed by the 
Grameen Foundation, providing technical assistance and a collateral deposit of $344,000.  The 
securities were purchased at a net present value, allowing SHARE to pay a rate of 8.75%, which 
was over 3% less than the rate of commercial loans (IFMR, 2007).  Also, a second securitization 
deal was made between ICICI Bank and BASIX in 2004 for $842,000 of its microloan portfolio.   
                                                 
6
 According to The Mix Market (www.mix.com), SHARE maintained about $44 million in loans 
in 2004, making this offering about 10% of its total portfolio, even though it was 25% of total 
loans, indicating that it was truly a microloan transfer.  These loans were simply assumed by the 
bank, not securitized and resold to investors as in a traditional securitization deal.  (To 
underscore the impressive and continued growth in this industry, SHARE's microloan portfolio 
grew from $44 million in 2004 to over $576 million in 2009, just five years later).   
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While these transactions appear to hint at a developing securities market for securitized 
microloans, positive reports of the ultimate profitability of these microloan purchases are hard to 
come by.  An acceleration in microloan purchases is not evident, and many reasons for this are 
enumerated in the following section.   
 
1.2.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of MiCDOs 
The recent surge of support of MiCDOs from stakeholders in microfinance arguably stems from 
its current and potential volume.  Until recently, there simply wasn't a great enough volume of 
microcredit origination to warrant its consideration as a viable asset class.  Now that this 
aggregate has crossed $25 billion (Dieckmann, 2007), the possibilities have changed.  The 
potential profitability of top tier microlenders has caught the interest of the investment 
community.  While attainment of this new market volume level is the main catalyst for this 
progression, there are several other reasons why MiCDOs can be mutually beneficial for MFIs 
and their investors.   
 
As an asset class, packages of microloans (or packaged loans to regional groups of microlenders, 
to stay within the MiCDO framework for now) would provide an investment that is fairly 
homogenous, subject to little prepayment risk, and resilient to economic shocks (Dieckmann 
2008, Galema & Lensink 2009).  MiCDOs could certainly present investors with an attractive 
risk-adjusted return, if default rates remain as stable as are widely reported for the more 
successful MFIs.  Loans to a handful of MFIs would also provide some diversification to the 
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investor.  However, the security would retain significant firm risk, since these loans are repaid by 
and backed only by a small group MFIs.   
 
For many investors, part of a "return" on their investment includes personal benefits, such as 
knowing that they hold a Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) (Morduch 1999, Copestake, 
2007, Dieckmann 2008).  Since some poverty has been alleviated by coupling entrepreneurial 
ability and drive with initial financing, investors in MFIs or their constituent clients are indirectly 
providing that opportunity to some of the billions of impoverished citizens of our globe.  
Marketing MiCDOs as an SRI may enhance investor interest in the asset class.   
 
While financialization techniques and market sophistication have evolved significantly in past 
decades to easily assimilate a new asset class, Wall Street investors are used to a well-regulated 
market.  Once we consider the debtors in a MiCDO as a small organization in south Asia, Africa, 
South America, etc. it is easily imagined how these standard rules of the developed world may 
not apply.  To provide investors with better assurances and become eligible for MiCDO funding, 
many MFIs will have to improve their corporate governance (Arun & Hulme 2008, Glaubitt et 
al. 2009, Swanson 2007).   
 
In some countries, currency and inflation risk is significant.  In places that suffer economic 
instability as a direct result of macro policy, the total risk presented to the foreign investor may 
simply be too great (Byström, 2008).  Currency risk is often viewed as a source of diversification 
to investors, but the risk of currency devaluation amid hyperinflation is universally unwelcome.  
This potential currency risk could significantly slow the development of international capital 
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markets tailored toward microfinance (Byström, 2008, Swanson 2007).  For many investors, the 
ability to effectively hedge this risk is essential.  Donated funds also represent a threat to the 
growth of commercial MFI financing.  Many microlenders are just beginning the transition from 
NGO to a profit-seeking, financially sustainable organization.  Donor funds will need to be put to 
use in ways other than direct MFI funding, or else some activity will be crowded out by this free 
financing (Byström 2008, Glaubitt et al. 2009).   
 
In summary, MiCDOs present investors with a possibility of fair risk-adjusted returns, 
diversification, and the added benefit of being a reasonable social investment.  Also, developed 
financial markets have the tools to effectively financialize these investments.  Challenges that 
remain include a weak legal and regulatory environment with idiosyncrasies across each border, 
macro policy challenges, country-specific, currency risk within each MiCDO that is not regional 
in nature, currency risk for the foreign investor even if only one currency is used for loan 
denomination, and the threat of donated funds "crowding out" profit-seeking efforts necessary to 
grow the industry to meet demand.   
 
1.2.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of Securitization 
The direct securitization of microloans is another way that investors can connect with 
impoverished borrowers.  It is this conduit to liquidity that now takes center stage in the 
discussion.  Early attempts at securitization, as noted earlier, have not been successful.  It is vital, 
then, that the strengths and weaknesses of securitization are analyzed, in search of a better 
method of securitization, if it is to be used at all in MFI financing.   
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Attractive investments with an infrastructure to create them   
As with MiCDOs, securitizations can offer investors a fair risk-adjusted return (even greater, 
when enhanced diversification is realized).  They are also classified as a Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI), and the investor of a securitized portfolio is able to take on the good faith of 
an individual or small group of impoverished borrowers instead of vouching for the general 
operations and activities of an MFI.  Also, the same developed markets that can create MiCDOs 
stand ready to establish securitization contracts.  In addition, there are reasons to prefer this form 
of risk transfer to MiCDOs.  First, investors are offered a "pure play" on the underlying asset, 
instead of relying on the viability of the MFI (Swanson, 2007).  The microloans as a pooled and 
securitized asset are vastly diversified, much more so than loans to a handful of organizations 
(Glaubitt et al, 2009).  Since securitized investments have their underlying value in the 
microloans themselves instead of the MFI, there is little firm risk.   
 
Reduced liquidity strain for the MFI 
Also, one marked benefit of securitization over MiCDO funding is the removal of liabilities from 
the balance sheet of the MFI.  Cash via a MiCDO provides extra liquidity, a portion of which can 
be loaned out.  This in turn expands leverage ratios, making the MFI more risky as a going 
concern.  When required rates of returns on loans to that MFI increase, the benefit is mitigated.  
Securitization allows for the sale of the receivables for cash without exacerbating the firm's 
leverage ratios.  This allows for further originations and subsequent sales, never forcing the MFI 
to approach an operational limit due to excess leverage.   
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However, these improvements come with a price.  It is straightforward to review the list of 
MiCDO challenges in section 2.1 and recognize that they also apply to securitizations.  The same 
legal risk, macro instability, and other challenges face direct securitizations of microloans in the 
traditional framework.  In addition, securitization presents an addendum list of obstacles to 
overcome.   
 
Extremely Short-term Loans 
A common securitization in developed markets is based on mortgage loans, with terms of 15-40 
years.  These loans can be packaged relatively infrequently, and allowed to perform over this 
time frame.  In contrast, many microloans are as short in term as just a few months.  Packaging 
these short-term loans for securitization would present the financial intermediary with 
significantly higher (i.e. more frequent) administrative costs than other securitizations, much as 
the MFIs wrestle with similar costs at origination.  This is a significant threat to the growth of 
any microloan securitization market (Byström, 2008, Swanson 2007).     
 
Lack of Financial Sophistication in Small MFIs 
There is significant technical, relational, and legal expertise required of an MFI to securitize its 
loans.  While it is true that many of these skills could be acquired in the market by using 
financial intermediaries, still there remains a need for knowledge and advocacy at the MFI level 
if a series of successful securitizations is to take place.  Most of the 10,000 MFIs in existence 





The originating MFI plays a substantial role in the local success of the microcredit market.  The 
relationships built and social pressures utilized in exacting repayment are vital to the success of 
microlending (Swanson 2007).  These ongoing efforts are very costly for the MFI.  Also, 
securitization passes the risk of the loan from the MFI to the investor.  Therefore, there is a great 
incentive to, after origination, let securitized loans perform without these efforts.  Potentially, 
moral hazard exists at the borrower level as well.  The close relationship necessary between an 
MFI and its client indicate significant communication between the borrower and the MFI 
representative.  The market's solution to the problem of these higher default rates would be to 
sever the relationship between foreign investors and MFIs once risk-adjusted returns fell 
sufficiently, making future securitizations (even if improvements were undertaken) much more 
difficult.  In this way, moving too quickly into securitizations could quite possibly even harm the 
evolution of the market into longer term practices.   
 
Summary 
The additional costs presented by traditional loan securitization over that of MFI-level CDOs in 
microloans clearly outweigh the benefits of occasional investor preference and added 
diversification.  It is this direct comparison that have led many to abandon microloan 
securitization as a promising possibility.  Still, the benefits of a promising avenue of funding, the 
creation of an attractive investment-grade asset, and the reduction of leverage from the balance 
sheets of MFIs are worth pursuing.  Success might rely on the existence of a custom designed 
intermediary available to address the challenges that currently stifle any microloan securitization 
market.   
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1.3 The Central Microcredit Clearinghouse 
In this section, I propose the formation of an entity that can address most, if not all, of the 
challenges identified here to direct securitization of microloans, and in fact provide multiple 
enhancements to the market as well.  Where traditional securitization techniques fall short in 
terms of cost-effectiveness, risk management, and practicality, a specific type of structured 
finance closely approaches the level of innovation that may succeed in developing this market.   
 
Multiple types of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) structures exist in developed 
markets.  One is the multi-seller structure, allowing multiple originators to combine assets in a 
securitization through program sponsor that then sells homogenized securities to investors in the 
market.  The proposed entity, the Central Microcredit Clearinghouse (CMC), is a regional 
clearinghouse for microloans set up to serve several potential functions, some of which are 
similar to the role played by the sponsor in an ABCP securitization.  In the following sections, 
the multiple purposes, the organization, the operation, and the solutions offered by a CMC will 
be explored.   
 
1.3.1 Functions of the Central Microcredit Clearinghouse 
The main function of the CMC is to stand ready to purchase microloans from member MFIs.  
While securitizations are most often large brokered deals (and often guaranteed by a third party), 
a microlender would be able to sell small to medium-sized batches of loans directly to its 
regional CMC for an actuarially discounted value, based on several criteria.  In this way, the 
CMC would serve the purpose of both the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and sponsor in 
traditional securitizations, but without the need for exclusivity to one particular originator, and 
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not for securitization of just one set of microloans.  The regional CMC would offer purchase 
agreements to any area MFI that met certain membership criteria, with each purchase made at the 
option of the participating MFI, facing independent and automated valuation.   
 
This valuation might be a function of the MFI's star rating on the Mix Market, the performance 
of past loans sold to the CMC, and the percentage of CMC securities held by the MFI of total 
assets under management
7
.  Inclusion of the Mix market rating is simple.
8
  If the MFI has a five 
diamond rating, then they are afforded a nonzero value for some binary variable in the valuation 
equation.  This will serve as an encouragement for the MFI to pursue the extra rating or due 
diligence report required for this fifth diamond, as well as the incentive to maintain that rating.   
 
Performance of past loans sold to the CMC would be vital in assessing the MFIs' ability to 
service current loans and the clients who receive them.  A ratio of currency received to currency 
loaned could easily be calculated for each interest rate level, loan size, and demographic 
variables relating to the borrower.  This would provide the CMC with a good estimate of a mean 
repayment rate for each future loan purchased from an MFI.  Using this information as a large 
portion of the purchase value of the loan would be one very important step in addressing the 
enormous moral hazard problem that plagues traditional securitizations, where the originator 
could pass along poor loans for excess profit.  Such a scheme would not be beneficial for an MFI 
                                                 
7
 As indicated in some areas below, a successful valuation will ultimately be more complex, 
including some variables for country risk, currency risk, inflation expectation and firm financial 
ratios at minimum.   
8
 The CMC would likely accept only four- and five-diamond rated MFI loans.   The Mix Market 
assigns a 1-5 diamond rating to an MFI based on disclosure levels, and four diamonds are given 
once the MFI has at least two consecutive years of audited financial statements with an auditor's 
opinion and notes.   
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in the long run, and they would likely be competed away by more stable MFIs.  In addition, 
initial sales of loans to the CMC by a newly participating MFI could be restricted to small 
amounts, until some accredited payment history is established.   
 
Third, using a purchase ratio of CMC securities and cash to the total of receivables purchased is 
a way to mitigate moral hazard.  Since the sale of microloans to a regional CMC allows an MFI 
to free up more cash for origination of additional loans, a constant pass-through of loans with no 
minimum holding percentage would essentially allow the MFI to quickly multiply its cash into a 
massive expansion of loans.
9
  Instead of assuming this risk, the CMC would purchase loans for a 
combination of cash and CMC-securitized assets, to be held at the CMC in the name of the MFI.   
 
Purchasing microloans from MFIs would bridge a large portion of the current funding gap; but 
the CMC is not a central bank, and cannot create money from nothing.  This organization will act 
more like a broker between profit-seeking investors, and MFIs with a comparative advantage in 
local lending.  Securitization of these microloans, in a style similar to that of investment banks, 
will allow the CMC to repackage and sell this debt both back to the MFIs it serves, and to 
domestic and foreign investors.   
 
By assessing the repayment risk, any country risk, inflationary pressure, etc. at the point of 
purchase, the CMC could then actuarially reduce each loan to an expected CMC currency unit 
(CMCU).  This currency unit would be denominated in the most internationally traded currency 
                                                 
9
 This would incite a one-time moral hazard for a small MFI.  Without limits, loans could be 
originated, immediately sold for cash to the CMC, and re-originated any number of times in a 
single day.  The MFI could then cease CMC membership, while hundreds or thousands of 
"clients" default.   
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of the region.  Then, currency futures could be obtained by the CMC for net currency exposure.  
This way, the CMCUs track closely to a single, stable currency, and investors from any corner of 
the globe will have the option of accepting this single currency risk, or hedging as one would 





The CMC would continue to create CMCUs every time it made a purchase of microloans.  This 
means that a CMC would maintain a constantly evolving pool of loans, with each CMCU 
representing a proportional claim on this dynamic pool of assets.  The relatively short duration of 
the microloans purchased would be immaterial to the CMC and its investors.  As various terms 
are continuously bundled together, the quality of CMCUs on the market would vary with the 
current average quality of microloans in the pool.  The return on a CMCU would be estimated by 
the deepness of the discount rate offered in purchase of the loans, and the variance of returns 
would depend on the ability of the CMC to accurately manage the valuation of the underlying 
pool at acquisition.   
 
Microborrower 











number of loans 
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Seeks  
R + σ(M - R) 
Cash and 
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          Loan 
payments 
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The CMCU has several attractive qualities as an investment.  It would be well diversified across 
borrowers, representing the collective repayments of all micro-borrowers of a region.  It would 
be valued and created independently by a nonprofit institution, with the mission of developing 
the investor-MFI connection through this indirect securitization channel, making it relatively 
easy and transparent for investors to value.  The social nature of the investment would remain, as 
the investor not only receives a nearly direct connection with the micro-borrower, but also 
indirectly supports the CMC with social objectives other than just investment brokering, to be 
described below.  Finally, a CMCU would be denominated in a single, stable, and hedgeable 
currency.   
 
Another useful function of the CMC is the provision of various standards of membership, 
governance, accounting & reporting practices, emergency financial assistance, and arbitration.  
The number and variety of microlenders in existence leaves potential investors with a dizzying 
array of information to assimilate.  Accounting practices vary widely, language barriers hinder 
communication, cultural norms require lenders to practice in different ways, with different rules; 
this leaves significant heterogeneity in microloan receivables.  It also leaves potential direct 
investors (large banks willing to accept loan packages, much like the ICICI purchase of 2004) 
wary of the counterparty risk.   
 
Finally, the CMC, through its incentivized loan purchase and securitization program, could 
actually serve to provide a little creative destruction to the field.  That is, the influence of the 
CMC could serve to grow the most successful microlenders, and at the same time, be a catalyst 
for some healthy crowding out of other microlenders who are already losing money, are 
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inefficient, or practice lending with methods that are ineffective or harmful to the client.  The 
acceleration of funding to MFIs in the field may also accelerate the market's ultimate response.   
 
1.3.2 Model, Structure, and Organization of the CMC 
In this section, I intend to briefly introduce some of the possibilities in organizing a regional 
CMC.  In section 4, I assume a South Asia CMC, and create a dataset to simulate ten years of 
activity.  This will show some of the potential direct benefits of the existence of a South Asia 
CMC (SACMC).  This section is written with this area in mind, although the structure here is 
flexible enough to export to every region of the world.   
 
1.3.2.1     Modeling the representative Microfinance Institution 
Assume there is a representative microfinance institution (MFI) in a geographical region.  There 
is demand for loaned funds from n identical potential micro-borrowers in that region.  
Transportation costs for borrowers to get to another MFI are prohibitive.  All n borrowers have 
potential entrepreneurial projects with chances of success of known probability, and other 
potential sources of income or lending sources for repayment of MFI loans.
10
  The combination 
of these factors (as well as the performance of the MFI in project development and collection 
activities) creates a probability of default, d, where with probability 1 - d, the MFI's loan will be 
paid in full, including interest charges.  For simplicity, I assume that if a borrower defaults, they 
will do so immediately after origination.  It is also reasonable to assume that the default rate is an 
increasing function of the interest rate chosen by the MFI.  Therefore, the probability of default 
is d(I), where I is the monthly interest rate, and dI > 0.   
                                                 
10
 The borrower is often more richly modeled in other settings, where adverse selection, strategic 
default, etc. are of interest.  Here, the focus is on the lender; the borrower will remain simplified.   
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Each identical representative borrower seeks a loan of size g.  The loan demand function is g(I), 
g(I) = 0 for some finite level of I, and gI < 0.  Total demand of loanable funds facing the 
representative MFI is then LD = ng(I).   
 
Each loan has an identical term of m months.  The payment expected from each borrower at time 











.  That is, interest for the term is entirely expensed by 
the borrower at origination.  This is known as a "flat rate" calculation, and is common practice 
among MFIs in developing nations.  It removes the prepayment incentive, and also creates an 
APY much larger than the stated interest rate.   
 
Each MFI is endowed with initial cash on hand of C0, and inelastically supplies this cash to the 
market in lending each period.  The MFI is able to borrow from capital markets at some rate rMFI, 
which is an exogenously determined rate greater than a net risk-free periodic rate R.  From this, 
the MFI chooses a debt level in each period of Dt.
11
  The supply curve of the representative MFI 
is then the perfectly inelastic curve of originations Ot = Ct + Dt.   
 
Each MFI has a fixed cost w of originating a new loan that is recognized at the time of loan 
origination.  This can be assumed to capture necessary search costs, screening, documentation, 
and all administrative expenses, including subsequent collection and processing of payments.  
Since the MFI originates a total loan portfolio addition of Ot in each period, lending to Ot/(g(I) + 
                                                 
11
 Perhaps rMFI = (R + σROA(M-R)/σM)*(1+Debt/Equity ratio of the MFI), for example.  The 
specific rate is beyond the scope of this paper, and does not impact the subsequent analysis of 
interest, which surrounds the CMC.   
 22 
w) borrowers, with origination expenses of wOt/(g(I) + w) in each period.  Each MFI is able to 
costlessly invest any cash on hand to earn the periodic risk-free net return R.   
 
If we allow the MFI to choose an interest rate in the face of their cash constraint and origination 
cost, the MFI will have cash in each period Ct of 



































That is, the ending cash balance in each period after zero is the ending cash balance from the 
prior period plus its investment income, plus the sum of payments net of defaults from the 
current period and the m-1 prior periods on past loans, less new originations and related costs, 
plus any debt held, minus any debt service payments.
12
  Also, assume that the MFI does not offer 
deposit accounts.  This removes a money multiplier effect from loaning its initial cash.   
 
Further assume that Ot < ng(I) for all "reasonable" levels of I; that is, there is excess demand for 
loans.
13
  Recall the origination fee w.  It is this variable that disallows an equation of Ot = ng(I).  
Indeed, if w = 0, then the MFI could simply loan tiny amounts of cash to each potential micro-
borrower with demand for a loan, charging a high enough interest rate such that the market was 
in equilibrium.  To maintain excess demand for loanable funds, it is sufficient to assume that Ot 
< wn.   
 
Equation (3.2.1.1) creates a trade-off for the MFI: higher interest rates bring in higher payments 
                                                 
12
 See Appendix A for more on this decision.  In subsequent discussion here, incoming cash each 















 will be occasionally substituted for Ct for notational ease.  
13
 The inclusion of w will be shown at the end of this section to limit the range of interest rates 
chosen by the MFI. 
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in a given loan, but it also incentivizes smaller loan sizes given that gI < 0, increasing the cost of 
origination as a percentage of assets under management.  Also, to simplify calculations, we will 
allow for "fractional loans" instead of rounding to the nearest whole optimal loan value.
14
   
 
The MFI has no incentive to hold on to cash in each period, if demand is sufficient to make 
lending worthwhile.  There are no liquidity reserve requirements, and no assumption of liquidity 
risk for the MFI.  So, the MFI has only capitalized interest and as total income, and origination 
fees and potential debt service as total expenses.  Idle cash is suboptimal; the MFI would prefer 
to use any cash for operational returns in excess of R.  Using (3.2.1.1), we can then allow prior 
period cash and debt to be zero, and Ot = Ct.  Then, solving for current period originations: 


















Equation (3.2.1.2) tells us that the outflows in each period will equal the inflows.  The payments 
received on prior loans, which are the sum of outstanding loans and capitalized interest net of 
defaults, are pooled and re-loaned, less the portion of the "loan plus fee" sum that is required for 
origination expenses.   
 
It is also important to specify that the MFI is assumed to be sustainable.  At this point, only a 
necessary condition is given.  Any loan made by the MFI must be assumed to return in 
expectation at least the undiscounted nominal cash equivalent over the term of the loan.  If this 
                                                 
14
 This is a fairly reasonable concession, given that the demand for loanable funds is downward 
sloping.  We assume that the MFI can find a borrower who then will take a loan at less than their 
reservation interest rate for the smaller loan amount.  This also allows the MFI to reduce 
origination costs on this last fractional loan, which is also implicitly assumed in the calculations.   
 24 
condition is not met, the MFI is simply granting, rather than microlending.  This requirement, 
then, is that expected repayments from period t+1 to period t+m sum to at least the sum of 
originations and related costs in time t.   













































Since (3.2.1.3) sums across m periods of identical payments, the expression can then be 
simplified: 
(3.2.1.4)     
 
 






Equation (3.2.1.4) is simply a statement that the net return on loans must be greater than or equal 
to zero.  This provides both a lower bound and an upper bound for the interest rate choice by the 
MFI
15
.  If the interest rate is too low, then interest income will not exceed the fixed origination 
expenses, even though originations will be relatively few, and of relatively large size.  If the 
interest rate is too high, then the many small loans originated will generate too large a number of 
origination expenses.  Since the interest rate has both an upper and lower bound, the borrowers' 
demand for funds g(I) is also constrained with an upper and lower bound.  All that is necessary 
to lead to a persistent disequilibrium is a sufficiently high number of borrowers n given the 
parameters chosen.   
 
 
                                                 
15
 This assumption is predicated on the existence of real roots for (3.2.1.4) with respect to the 
interest rate.  Since the expression is to the power of m, there are many potential roots.  For 
subsequent analysis, it is necessary that at least two real roots may exist, which is shown in 
Appendix B.    
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Growth of the MFI 
The gross growth rate of originations is simply    11/   tttt DCDC ,  And this gross growth 
rate is provided by the left hand side of equation (3.2.1.4).  Therefore, an MFI is expected to 
grow at the gross rate of a growth factor (GF) given by: 
(3.2.1.5)     
 
 







 11  
which is a non-negative rate for the sustainable MFI (and at this point must be larger than R to 
induce lending).   
 
The MFI's profit is revenue, or 
 



















.  Profit is then: 
(3.2.1.6)     
 




















 11 . 
 




















Profit is then, more simply,  
(3.2.1.7)     
 










To solve explicitly for the profit-maximizing interest rate, we assume linear demand
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  IIg   , and a linear default rate function   IId   .   
 
Then, profit maximization for the MFI is the solution of: 










A first order condition provides: 
 





















At this point, the denominator, cash, and debt all drop out.  Also,   11  mI  can be cancelled 
throughout.  This leaves a simplified expression: 
(3.2.1.8)                IImIIIIwI   1111  
    011  III   
The I
*
 that equates this expression is the optimal interest rate that the MFI will choose for profit 
maximization. This rate also maximizes the MFI's growth factor:      
(3.2.1.9)     
 
 











The choice of debt level follows immediately from this.  If I
*
 > rMFI, then the MFI will borrow 
until I
*
 = rMFI.   
 
1.3.2.2     Modeling the Central Microcredit Clearinghouse 
Assume now the existence of a nonprofit organization, with the goal of maximizing the number 
                                                 
16
 Note that this assumption need not describe the entire demand curve.  For purposes here, we 
only need to assume linearity of demand within the limits of interest rate feasibility given by the 
sustainability requirement of (3.2.1.4).   
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of loans in its service region.  The main function of this organization, the Central Microcredit 
Clearinghouse (CMC) is to allow the sustainable MFI to achieve the optimum growth rate shown 
in (3.2.1.8) within periods, by augmenting its loan portfolio via a money multiplier maintained 
by the CMC.  Another main function of the CMC is then to securitize its resulting portfolio of 
microloans, allowing investors a "pure play" on a standardized investment unit.   
 
To see the leverage effect, consider the representative MFI that has just finished loaning its cash 
balance of Ct in time t.  With many other potential borrowers waiting, the MFI is forced also to 
wait until payments arrive in period t + 1 to sum to Ct+1, so that another period of lending can 
ensue.  However, now assume that the regional CMC is in operation, and the representative MFI 
is approved as a member agency.  The CMC now stands ready to purchase the portfolio of 
microloans from the MFI at an actuarially determined rate of p times the expected value of the 
portfolio, where 0 < p < 1.  A fraction 1-f is purchased for cash, and the remaining fraction f is 
purchased for investment units in the pool of underlying loans at the CMC, maintained at the 
CMC in the name of the MFI.  It is the CMC's choice of the  values of p and f that allow it, 
indirectly, to influence the number of loans granted.   
The discounted purchase rate p ensures that some expected value is passed on to investors of the 
resulting CMC securities, and this total expected gross return is 1/p.  Therefore, the MFI is left 
with the choice in each period to invest cash in an outside risk-free investment with gross 
periodic return R, a risky market asset M, invest in borrowers with gross periodic expected return 
 
 








, or to connect microborrowers to the CMC by originating 












 on portion 1-f of the sale, receiving CMC securities for f portion 
of the sale, and reinvesting the cash in more microloans, effectively leveraging the portfolio by a 
calculable multiplier.   
 
The summation of these repeated loan balances, reduced in each round by the fraction 1 - f and 
augmented by the growth factor net of purchase 
 
 





11  are a geometric 
series, leading to a Maximum Leveraged Growth Factor (MLGF) of  
(3.2.2.1)     
 
 























From (3.2.2.1), it is unclear whether MLGF > GF.  This depends on, among other things, the 
value of p.  If the CMC pays a purchase price that is "too low", it is reasonable that the MFI 
would be better off originating microloans for itself without partnering with the CMC.  Given the 
securities ratio f, there exists some price pmin for the CMC that makes MLGF = GF.  This can be 
found from (3.2.2.1) as 















The CMC must offer a purchase rate greater than pmin to induce sales by the MFI.  This allows a 
maximum return to the investor of CMC securities of the inverse of (3.2.2.2).  It is quite possible 
to have a sustainable MFI where (3.2.1.4) holds (i.e., FG > 1), and yet the MFI does not engage 
in lending because FG < R.  However, for purchase levels p > pmin, we know that MLGF > GF 
(where GF > 1).  This allows for the condition MLGF > R > GF.  In this case, the presence of 
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the CMC allows the MFI to sustainably lend, where it would not on its own.  However, this 
would require concessionary investing, as the return 1/pmin would necessarily be less than 1+R.  
Regardless, this possibility exists with the leveraging effect offered by a CMC.
17
  The sustainable 
and active lender, where FG > R, is able to grow at the faster rate of MLGF when p > pmin.   
 
The discount factor p is also bounded from above.  The CMC is assumed to get its funding from 
investors, who demand an expected gross return 1/p that is at least the rate compensated for the 
amount of risk (measured in standard deviation of returns) that the CMCU presents.  Assume that 
investors demand a return provided by the standard Capital Market Line (CML) as:
18
 









A higher f reduces the expected variance of the investment return, also working to satisfy the 
constraint, but lowers the MLGF.  The assumed relationship that links the leveraging factor f to 
the risk factor σCMCU is simply σCMCU = (k/f)σM, where k is some scalar to account for the 
assumed relative variance of the CMC security and the market portfolio, given the default 
multiple of 1/f.   
 
The CMC then maximizes the MFI's growth rate of MLGF, via selection of p and f, given the 
constraint that   MCMCU RMRp  //1  .  Given that 0 < f < 1, and assuming that the MFI is 
sustainable (e.g. equation 3.2.1.4 is satisfied), both the leveraging variable f and the growth 
                                                 
17
 Perhaps this may be  appropriate in an initial operation phase, or else a special program for 
directed funds.   
18
 Note that 1/p is a gross rate of return; investors demand a rate 1/p-1, which is equivalent to 
p
p1 .   
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factor GF are positive.  If we substitute (3.2.1.8) into (3.2.2.1), a first derivative of the MLGF 
with respect to the discount rate p provides 
(3.2.2.4)     














This clearly shows that the CMC achieves its goal of greater loan takeup with a higher value of 
the discount rate p.  This is intuitive; a higher discount rate p leaves more profit with the MFI, 
allowing the inelastic supply of funds to the market to be larger.  Since we already know that the 
choice of variable p is bounded from above, and that the CMC will choose the highest possible 
level of p, we can now use this constraint with equality: 









Given the assumption that σCMCU = (k/f)σM, we can combine this with (3.2.2.5) to find 










This allows us to substitute the choice variable p with its highest value, that which satisfies 
(3.2.2.6).  This substitution into the original objective function, the MLGF, provides us with 




































































The substitution of the constraint now allows us to treat this as an unconstrained optimization, 
and we simply derivate the MLGF with respect to the remaining choice variable, f.  Again, with 
substitution (purely for notational ease) of GF for the growth factor expression 
 
 
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We can immediately eliminate the denominator and a few like numerator terms.  Continuing to 
simplify, and reintroducing the growth factor form, the entire equation simplifies to an explicit 
solution for the securities purchase ratio: 


















Equation (3.2.2.8) provides an expression for f
*
 that can be seen as a simple ratio: net market 
return over and above the risk free rate divided by the MFI's net operational return over and 
above the risk-free rate, all multiplied by twice the scalar k.  Recall that f is the proportion of the 
CMC's purchase offer that is paid in securities; therefore, a higher value of f reduces leverage 
(and consummate risk) for the MFI.  Equation (3.2.2.8) is then very intuitive.  A higher market 
premium will, ceteris paribus, increase the return demanded by investors of CMC securities, 
lowering the discount rate p and increasing the optimal securities ratio f, as the MLGF benefits 
more at this point from a reduction in variance than a gain in expected return.  Conversely, if the 
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MFIs growth factor increases, the optimum securities ratio f is lower, since there is more benefit 
from the expected return brought on by additional leverage than the loss associated with the 
increased variance of expected return.   
 
To ensure that this solution for f
*
 is indeed a maximum, we can explore the second derivative of 
the modified objective function.  With a little algebra, an equivalent MLGF can be stated as 

















Derivating this expression also leads to (3.2.2.8), but the algebraic result lends itself a little better 






































































































































































































































































































































, then both the numerator and the denominator 
are clearly positive, and with the term in front clearly negative, the entire expression is negative.  
We can show this to be true by remembering that the discount rate   1/1  RM
f
k
Rp .  




.  Next, substitute the expression for f
*













.  Finally, multiply both sides of this inequality by pGF, 









k .  In the 
numerator, we know that the discount rate, the MFI's growth factor, and the market premium are 
all positive.  In the denominator, it is already assumed for participation that the growth factor of 
the MFI must be greater than R, otherwise the MFI will not lend.  With a positive scalar k, we 
may confirm that this inequality holds, affirming that the optimal f
*
 found in (3.2.2.8) is indeed a 




A Note on Infinite Leverage 
The modeling of the CMC thus far has been constructed under the assumption that the leverage 
provided by the CMC is finite.  However, this is not strictly the case.  Note from (3.2.2.1) that 







.  A growth factor greater than this value will 
cause the MLGF to be negative.  To see this intuitively, consider an MFI with great success in 







, the MFI will be able to 
sell originated loans to the CMC, receiving  fGFp 1  in cash.  This amount would be greater 
than the cash used to originate the loans, so the MFI would be able to increase its intraperiod 
cash balance with each round of sales to the CMC.  As this would present large firm-specific risk 
to the CMC, we may simply assume that the CMC sets a maximum MLGF for each MFI in a 
given year.  A limit will be chosen in the empirical section.   
 
Summary of Theory 
The combination of origination costs with downward sloping demand allows for an optimal 
interest rate for the MFI that is not a maximum nor a minimum.  Profit maximization demands 
that the MFI select a rate that balances the opposing forces of costs and revenue generation, 
leading to an outcome similar to that of the credit rationing literature.  With this maximization in 
place, a nonprofit Central Microcredit Clearinghouse has been shown to potentially enhance MFI 
returns, and concomitantly loan balances offered to the poor, with repeated intraperiod purchases 
of loan originations.   
 
It has been shown that the CMC may choose an optimal discount rate for asset purchases from 
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the MFI, as well as a ratio of which the purchase price is paid for with securities instead of cash.  
The discount rate chosen is the highest that allows for an acceptable risk/return profile of the 
resulting CMC security, so that investors are minimally satisfied.  The securities purchase ratio is 
selected with consideration of the tradeoff between leveraging the MFI's portfolio and limiting 
risk.  This assumption connects the discount rate and the securities purchase ratio, so that an 
unconstrained optimization can be completed with consideration of a single variable.   
 
While it is possible that an MFI may be able to infinitely leverage its portfolio within the 
confines of the model, this shortfall can clearly be addressed in practice.  If the growth factor of 
the MFI is truly large enough to allow for this possibility, and is also sustainable over several 
rounds of intraperiod growth, and is not contained by risk levels, then it would eventually be 
contained by market saturation, which falls outside of the model.   
 
1.3.3     Solutions Offered by the CMC to Direct Securitization Challenges 
In this final section of the introduction of the Central Microcredit Clearinghouse, I will revisit 
each of the challenges identified as threats to direct securitization, and show how they are 
addressed by the CMC's near-direct securitization innovation.  This is a qualitative discussion of 
factors leading to the original market failure of microloan securitization, now with an eye on the 
CMC as modeled in section 3.2.   
 
The Legal and Regulatory Environment, Macro Policy, and Currency Risk 
An investor looking for the chance to assist impoverished citizens of south Asia while making a 
fair risk adjusted return would not likely want to assume the risk associated with purchasing 
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claims on microloans in Afghanistan, for example.  Most investors are unfamiliar with foreign 
law, and want a simple way to invest with some basic level of security.  The CMC of a region 
such as south Asia would choose to locate in a country with the most favorable regulatory 
environment, and the most stable and popular currency for ease of hedging the portfolio to it.  
While country risk, political risks, currency risks, policy risks, etc. all remain for a direct 
investor, a CMCU would minimize these risks by allowing foreign investors to purchase 
CMCUs, and then have the option to hedge their domestic currency.   
 
Donated Funds   
Donors will need a new focus.  Donations for direct MFI funding will only serve to crowd out 
market activity, and retard the growth of the sector.  Subsidized microlending should give way to 
commercial microlending.  The CMC would provide donors with an option that makes their gift 
much more powerful than one offered to an MFI.  A gift to the CMC for the microloan purchase 
and securitization program, much like an investment dollar, would translate directly into an 
additional loan, but with the security of knowing that the micro lender is serving its clientele in a 
way consistent with the donor's social objectives, and in the most effective and sustainable way.  
Even though this would be a popular and dominant portion of the CMC's activities, most donors 
would choose to give to other programs within the CMC.  Education initiatives, geographic 
expansion efforts, micro-borrower advocacy programs, and entrepreneurial guidance efforts are 
all potential activities for a CMC.  These various programs would present benefactors with a 
more effective use of donor dollars than direct lending; they could target special initiatives of 
choice under the umbrella of the CMC.  
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Extremely Short-Term Loans  
This presents significant problems for any direct securitization.  Loan packages would need to be 
created so often, that securitization would be very costly on an annualized basis, compared to 
other types of securitizations.  However, the ongoing creation of CMCUs negate the importance 
of average loan term.  As new loans come into the pool, and old loans are paid, (or fall into 
default), the loan acquisition formula is updated to ensure that the CMCU value is relatively 
stable.   
 
Lack of Financial Sophistication in Small MFIs 
Smaller MFIs do not possess the expertise in myriad areas necessary for successful loan 
securitizations.  The presence of the CMC would allow the smallest MFI to securitize their loan 
portfolio into CMCUs with minimal training and an internet connection.  An online portal for 
CMC loan acquisitions would be made simple for the microlender, offering a rate to each lender 
based on the criteria discussed above, and in any regional language that is required.   
 
Moral Hazard 
The presence of the moral hazard problem is one of the main reasons that direct securitizations 
are not expected to ever play a large role in MFI financing.  It does indeed appear to be the 
Achilles' heel of traditional securitization of microloans.  The CMC battles this problem in 
multiple ways.  First, MFIs will initially be permitted to sell only a portion of their portfolio to 
the CMC, receiving a combination of fraction 1-f in cash and f in CMCUs.  Third, the value that 
the MFI receives in each securitization will be directly linked to past performance of loans, 
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encouraging the close contact and utilization of social pressures that have made microlending 
success stories in recent decades.   
 
1.4     Numerical Simulation of a South Asia CMC 
In order to better demonstrate the possibilities that exist, this section presents a pseudo-
hypothetical simulation of MFI activity, using data available on actual MFIs operating in South 
Asia, for the ten-year period of 2001-2010.  Following a brief analysis of the growth of 
microlending in South Asia during this decade,  I will introduce the South Asia CMC (SACMC), 
and run a comparative simulation of what may have transpired during the same time given the 
existence of a regional CMC.   
 
1.4.1.1     Data 
The Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) Market collects and processes annual data 
submitted by roughly 2,000 microfinance institutions around the world, representing over 90 
million borrowers.  Information is submitted by representatives of MFIs, or obtained from 
external audits, financial statements, management reports, and other sources.  All data are 
converted from local currencies into USD using an average conversion rate for the period under 
survey.  Some reporting periods are more or less than a full year; in these cases, data are 
annualized using an "annualization factor" calculated based on the number of days in the given 
reporting period.   
 
A full set of MIX Market data is available for download at www.mixmarket.org.  The dataset is 
updated periodically with new rounds of quarterly (for most recent) and annual data.  The earliest 
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records date to 1995, with a relatively small amount of data available before 2000.  Each MFI is 
awarded a diamond rating from 1 to 5, based on its perceived level of data disclosure and 
transparency.  Diamond ratings of 4 or 5 diamonds indicate that data was submitted, and at least 
an external audit was performed.  The majority of MFIs in the MIX Market database have a 
rating of at least 4 diamonds.  Data available from MFIs include the name and location, legal 
status, and periodic information about total assets, gross loan portfolio, equity, deposits, various 
calculated financial ratios and averages, return, financial expense, numbers of borrowers, and 
personnel.  Nearly 11,000 records of annual data are available in the full download, offering data 
on more than 1,900 microfinance institutions.  These institutions are broken down into 6 regions 
around the world, covering 116 countries.   
 
For purposes of this simulation, only data from South Asia was retained, and only for years 
2001-2010.  Some data records are quarterly data provided for years 2010 and 2011, in addition 
to 2010 annual data.  The quarterly records were deleted, and only the annual records were 
retained.  Some annual records were deleted for missing both asset and return data.  Debt was 
calculated from equity and the debt to equity ratios provided.  Net income was calculated using 
the average ROA and ROE ratios provided.  Net income was then divided by beginning of period 
assets to serve as a proxy for the MFIs growth factor in a given year.  
 
To err on the side of conservative in the comparative simulation, records with missing return data 
that were retained were given an estimated growth factor of one, sufficient to negate CMC 
activity for the following year, given that it was also assumed to not have CMC activity 
associated with it in the current year.  If so, this would provide distortion to the results, and the 
record was deleted.  Any record with missing return data for a year within a series of operational 
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years with CMC activity had returns estimated based on surrounding ROA data, since deletion of 
these records would be more disruptive to the simulation.  This adjustment was made for just 5 
records.
19
  Assets were estimated for 2 records.
20
  Two MFIs were removed from the dataset for 
having only 2001 balance sheet data, and no activity.
21
   
 
1.4.1.2     Microfinance Institutions in South Asia 
The South Asian region per Mix Market demarcation includes the countries of Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.  Some basic information for reported 
activity and financial position is shown in Table 4.1.2.1, along with indicators of income and 





















# of 4-5 
Diamond 
MFIs 
Afghanistan 12 $   127,276,014 268,431 $474 $410 36.0%
*
 6 
Bangladesh 29 $2,633,780,287 22,656,208 $116 $700 31.5% 11 
Bhutan 1 $     94,992,904 24,476 $3,244 $1,870 23.2%
*
 0 
India 94 $5,251,114,050 31,794,850 $165 $1,270 37.2%
*
 47 
Nepal 28 $   153,710,606 725,187 $212 $490 25.2%
*
 19 
Pakistan 27 $   261,192,518 1,883,013 $139 $1,050 22.3%
*
 16 




*indicates that data is for a year close to 2010 
                                                 
19
 This was done for VYCCU in Nepal for 2006, BMSCCSL in Nepal for 2006, BASTOB in 
Bangladesh for 2008, CSS in Bangladesh for 2007, and Shakti in Bangladesh for 2010. 
20
 This was done for WDFH in Sri Lanka for 2005 and 2006, using asset/gross loan portfolio 
ratios and the surrounding asset balances for 2004 and 2007.  Growth factors of one were 
assumed in these years.   
21
 These were CCODER in Nepal and NLCL in Pakistan.   
22
 Data is from the Mix Market (www.mixmarket.org), and the World Bank (data.worldbank.org) 
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There are several initial items of note.  First, while there are 209 MFIs operating in the 7-nation 
region designated by the MIX as South Asia, only 105 of these possess the necessary history and 
transparency to earn a 4 or 5 diamond Mix Market rating.  The SACMC could start securitizing 
loans from 6 of the 7 countries, but efforts in Bhutan would initially be limited to assisting MFIs 
with reporting and transparency issues so that they can achieve membership status.  For this 
reason, Bhutan will not be included in the remaining analyses.   
 
The MFIs reporting data in south Asia combine to a gross loan portfolio as of 2010 of $9 billion.  
Dividing the gross loan portfolio by the number of active borrowers in each nation provides an 
average loan size for the reported loan activity in each country.  When we compare this with the 
GNI per-capita, we find that the average borrower of Afghanistan's MFIs actually borrows over 
100% of their per-capita GNI.  For the other five countries, the average loan size ranges from 
13% to 43% of per-capita GNI, with an overall weighted mean of 16.3%
23
.  These numbers 
indicate that an average micro-borrower in this region receives about 2 months of the nation-
wide average income for a typical microloan.  The final column counts only the four and five 
diamond rated MFIs.  This reduces the gross loan portfolio under consideration from $9 billion 
to $7.7 billion, but removes half of the original 209 MFIs represented.  This relatively small 
reduction in total assets demonstrates that the largest MFIs are also those with sufficient history 
and transparency to earn those higher diamond ratings.  
 
The headcount ratio is captured here only as an input to a rough indication of market penetration.  
Assume that just half of all impoverished persons (found as the product of each nation's 
                                                 
23
 With Afghanistan removed, and ignoring Bhutan, Nepal is the new outlier, with borrowers 
having an average of 43.3% GNI per capita.  The other 4 are all between 13.0% and 17.6%.   
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headcount ratio and population) would both qualify for a microloan, and choose to accept it.  
Dividing the number of active borrowers by this figure shows us market penetration estimates for 
each nation, displayed in the second column of Table 2.  This estimate is skewed by those MFIs 
reporting microloans that are of above average size (under the assumption that many loans are 
claimed as microloans, although they are granted to borrowers with higher incomes).  To adjust 
for this, we might consider loan size, dividing this penetration estimate1 by an adjustment 
figure
24
 to create a Market penetration estimate2.  This exercise provides us with a reasonable 












Afghanistan 10,482,120 0.6% 0.1% 
Bangladesh 51,793,875 39.1% 36.6% 
India 440,685,708 6.5% 7.8% 
Nepal 7,454,916 8.4% 3.0% 
Pakistan 37,967,980 3.1% 3.6% 
Sri Lanka 1,316,490 20.4% 18.0% 
Table 4.1.2.2 
 
1.4.1.3     Completion and Augmentation of Actual Data 
A number of assumptions must be made to make use of existing data in imposing a Central 
Microcredit Clearinghouse in south Asia.  First, only the 4 and 5 diamond MFIs were used in the 
simulation, under the assumption that the CMC would not purchase loans from MFIs that lacked 
                                                 
24
 This adjustment was also simple: I divided the loan average as a percentage of GNI per capita 
as mentioned earlier by its average for the area of 0.163, the average for the area, creating an 
adjustment figure increasing in above average loan size.  I then divided the original penetration 
estimate by this adjustment figure to arrive at Market penetration estimate2.   
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this level of transparency.  Also, it is assumed that if an MFI qualifies for CMC affiliation, and 
purchase of receivables, the MFI will sell all receivables to the CMC when p > pmin, and use all 
cash received to originate more loans for sale, continuing this intraperiod loop to take advantage 
of the multiplier effect, reaching the Maximum Leveraged Growth Factor (MLGF) as modeled.   
 
From here, the growth factor (GF) and MLGF for each MFI shall be indexed by m = 1...M, and 
time shall be indexed t = 1...T, allowing for a matrix of empirical growth factors represented by 







, 0mtMLGF , 
which indicates an infinite multiplier.  There are instances in the data when the proxied mtGF  
exceeds this "limit," which would allow the MFI to originate loans, sell fraction f at the 
discounted rate to the CMC, and still receive more cash back from the sale than it had in assets at 
the beginning of the period. To address this, some maximum was needed, and that maximum was 
set rather arbitrarily at 3.
25
   
 
The procedure for simulating MFI data begins with its first financial position of record.  In its 
second financial position of record, income statement activity is reported for that year.  Two 
years of financial position are then the minimum for provision of a growth factor estimate, from 
which subsequent CMC eligibility can be determined.  The third year of record provides the third 
financial position, and the second set of return data.  This is the MFI's first possible chance to 
enhance their activity in partnership with the CMC.  For each year of record, if p > pmin for the 
                                                 
25
 In an effort to leave the simulation free from constraints as much as possible, 3 was chosen as 
a rather high limit.  Note that this means an MFI would be able to use CMC cash to triple its size 
in a given year.  Also, of the 686 MLGFs estimated in the dataset, only 11 reached this 
maximum value, and in only 6 of those instances was the MFI eligible for CMC funding in that 
period, and so was able to triple its simulated value.   
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MFI in the prior year, then the MFI will sell all loans to the CMC in the current year.  Since 10 
years of data were collected and used for this simulation, each MFI retained in the dataset has 1-
9 years of financial activity reported, and 0-8 years of financial activity augmented with 
receivable sales to the CMC.  Table 4.1.3.1 provides a snapshot of what data is available from 
each year. 
 
A total of 133 MFIs are included in the dataset.  The first 3 columns of Table 4.1.3.1 demonstrate 
a considerable amount of turnover in reporting (and potentially, operation) of these 
organizations.  Only 12 MFIs reported data for all 10 years under observation.  All MFIs in the 
dataset reported a continuous and uninterrupted set of years. A few items had to be imputed, as 
reported in the previous section.   
 
The summation of balance sheet items grew at roughly the same pace from year to year.  On 
average, MFIs in this region expanded with largely the same debt/asset and debt/equity ratios.  
Assets grew at an average rate of 37.6% over this time period, debt at an average rate of 38.8%, 
and equity at an average rate of 35.0%.  Meanwhile, the balance of outstanding loans grew at an 
average rate of 38.8%, maintaining a relatively consistent ratio of loans to both assets and debt.  
This indicates that perhaps MFIs choose to maintain a stable debt ratio, and that perhaps an 
expansion of assets via a CMC receivables purchase program would precede an expansion of 
debt, furthering asset expansion even more.  However, this is not an assumption made in the 
simulation.  Actual debt values are assumed in the simulation to be unchanged.  Additional 
lending made possible by the CMC is assumed to expand the asset balance of the MFI, and also 












2002 35 $792M $569M $586M $206M 2.5M 
2003 62 $1,118M $773M $781M $336M 11.7M 
2004 86 $1,551M $1,102M $1,138M $414M 15.6M 
2005 98 $2,174M $1,578M $1,704M $471M 21.8M 
2006 107 $2,935M $2,131M $2,324M $610M 27.7M 
2007 102 $4,377M $3,208M $3,563M $813M 34.0M 
2008 110 $5,942M $4,432M $4,703M $1,238M 43.4M 
2009 107 $8,79M $6,707M $7,068M $1,719M 50.7M 
2010 97 $9,899M $7,638M $7,737M $2,167M 63.3M 
Table 4.1.3.1 
 
The number of loans originated by each MFI is not included in the dataset.  Assumptions must be 
made regarding loan activity to estimate this number.  Since the purpose of the simulation is a 
comparison of MFI activity with and without the presence of the CMC, these assumptions 
become less important.  For the purposes of the simulation, it is assumed that the number of 
loans granted in a year is the average of the number of loans outstanding at the beginning and the 
end of a given year, divided by the average loan balance.  Average loan balance, if missing, is 
assumed to be the prior year's average loan balance.  This methodology produces an estimate of 
the number of loans in each period that is comparable to the number of active borrowers 
reported.   
 
1.4.1.4     Simulation of the South Asia CMC 
The CMC, as modeled in section 3.2, was shown to offer an expansion of an MFI's growth factor 
to that of a maximum leveraged growth factor.  This was calculated explicitly with the variables 
introduced in the model, but this alone fails to demonstrate the real impact that a CMC might 
have on both lenders and borrowers in a geopraphical region.  For instance, the number of loans 
 46 
and the loan amounts both with and without CMC inclusion are not calculated in the model, as 
many things such as loan demand, loan tenor, optimal interest rates, etc. would all need to be 
estimated.   
 
By reaching to actual empirical data, these values can be obtained by calibrating the model, and 
estimating several items of interest to policymakers, asking questions such as: How many extra 
borrowers would be served?  What would the differential effects be across the nations?  Would 
market saturation be reached anywhere?  How would the expansion of investor dollars compare 
to the total asset balances already in place in microfinance institutions?  Through this final effort, 
some estimates may be provided for these questions.   
 
To begin a simulation of the CMC model in South Asia, a growth factor for each MFI for each 
year of observation was needed.  Such a growth factor could be estimated as modeled, using a 
cost per loan, interest income, etc.  However, this would ignore idiosyncratic and systematic 
risks that affected microlending in this region over the decade.  The growth factor, under the 
assumption that cash is inelastically supplied to the microloan market by each MFI in each 
period, serves as a measure of growth for the organization given beginning period assets.  For 
this reason, the return on assets (ROA) measure provided was used to calculate net income for 
each period, and this was used in conjunction with the beginning period asset balance to create a 
proxy for the growth factor in each of the 10 years, across each of the 133 MFIs.   
 
With the array mtGF , the array mtMLGF  can be calculated, using (3.2.2.1), with the additional 
parameters for the fraction of loan value purchased for noncash consideration f and the gross 
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purchase discount factor p.  The gross discount factor p has two main effects that essentially 
"compete" with each other in terms of CMC profitability and coverage.  Higher gross discount 
rates approaching one leave the CMC with little or negative gross return to pass along to 
investors, compromising its ability to facilitate a securitized microloan market.  However, a low 
discount rate, such as below 0.90, would disallow participation of most MFIs in most years.  To 
see this, consider again equation (3.2.2.2) which provides pmin, the smallest gross discount rate at 
which an MFI would find it advantageous to participate in the receivables purchase program.  A 
higher mtGF  directly translates into a lower pmin; for instance, given f = 0.25, and 1.1mtGF , or 
a growth rate of 10%, together provide a pmin = 0.93.
26
   
 
From (3.2.2.2) we can also see that: 
(4.1.4.1)     
 
 


































As long as the growth factor is greater than one (a condition for eligibility to transact with the 
CMC), this derivative is positive, showing that a higher noncash purchase fraction f increases the 
pmin for each MFI, making it less likely to participate.  Therefore, a sufficiently low f and a 
relatively high p will allow more MFIs to participate in the CMC program.   
 
                                                 
26
 Ideally, a CMC would actuarily calculate this discount rate for each MFI continuously as a 
dynamic "offer" rate, addressing firm-specific risk and any changes in repayment rates.  This 
intraperiod flexibility would insure the CMC against losses which will be shown as a higher 
variability of returns in the simulation; this assumption of a single, annual p for each MFI is then 
conservative, as far as the financial health of the CMC is concerned.   
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The choice of p for each MFI in each year is set as in the model, where the CMC chooses the 
highest discount rate that will satisfy investors in the resulting CMC securities.  This is given by 
equation (3.2.2.5).  The market rate is taken as the average S&P500 return from 1926-2008, 
which was 12.26%.  The standard deviation of these returns was 19.97%.  A risk-free rate proxy 
is taken for each year, using the 3-month T-bill rate.  These figures were provided by the FRED 
St. Louis database.  The cash purchase ratio of f offered by the CMC is also calculated from the 
model, using the loan number maximizing value given by equation (3.2.2.8).  The last parameter 
to estimate is the scalar k, which is designed to reconcile the emerging standard deviation of 
returns for the CMC securities with investor demand.  A level of k=0.1 was chosen for the 
simulation, as this nicely approximated the ratio of estimated sigmas for the CMC security and 
the market portfolio over the period, and left the resulting geometric return a conservative 5.2 
percentage points in excess of the estimated capital asset line.   
 
Using calculated values of f and p for each MFI in each year, each element mtMLGF  was then 
calculated.  As stated above, this leveraged factor was limited to 3, so that none approached 
infinity.  For each year that an MFI had a sufficient prior year return to qualify for origination 
sales, it was assumed that the MFI expanded its balance sheet through a repeated intraperiod 
cycle of sales and microloan originations.  In instances when mtGF  was insufficient to justify 
sales, the MFI's loan portfolio was assumed to expand at the same rate as it originally did for that 
year.  As assets increase beyond the original balances, equity is assumed to increase in tandem, 





















2002 35  $792M 2.5M    
2003 62 7 $1,258M 36.5M $1,981M $2,243M 13.26% 
2004 86 11 $2,179M 87.7M $5,440M $5,983M 9.96% 
2005 98 15 $3,586M 187.6M $9,569M $10,498M 9.71% 
2006 107 11 $5,380M 337.1M $16,923M $18,967M 12.07% 
2007 102 10 $8,308M 310.3M $16,600M $17,912M 7.90% 
2008 110 15 $11,046M 115.9M $2,094M $2,201M 5.13% 
2009 107 30 $14,595M 241.7M $19,527M $21,115M 8.13% 
2010 97 28 $16,859M 308.0M $24,247M $26,425M 8.98% 
Table 4.1.4.1 
 
Table 4.1.4.1 provides a summary of the simulated microfinance activity in South Asia for years 
2003-2010 with the presence of a SACMC.  Even among this censored sample of MFIs with a 
four or five diamond rating from the Mix Market, the vast majority of MFIs still fail to qualify 
for CMC receivable sales in any given year, having an insufficient return on assets for the prior 
year.  However, even though MFIs only qualified for CMC purchases approximately 13% of the 
time, for those successful MFIs, these opportunities provided explosive growth.  For instance, 
while total assets of this subset of MFIs increased 12.5 times from 2002 to 2010, the CMC-
simulated asset level rose over 21 times that of 2002, even with the assets of most MFIs 
unchanged.     
 
The number of microloans granted was shown to expand at a much greater rate than assets.  The 
continual cycle of origination, sales, and repayment in the period allows the number of loans to 
increase from 270 million during the ten year period to over 1.6 billion loans.  Ignoring any 
primary effects of poverty reduction, and any secondary effects of economic development in the 
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region from this massive expansion of microcredit in South Asia, penetration rates should be 












Afghanistan 10,482,120 0.6% 0.1% 
Bangladesh 51,793,875 343.0% 328.4% 
India 440,685,708 8.7% 10.6% 
Nepal 7,454,916 8.8% 3.2% 
Pakistan 37,967,980 4.0% 4.8% 
Sri Lanka 1,316,490 20.4% 18.4% 
Table 4.1.4.2 
 
Afghanistan and Sri Lanka had no participating MFIs, and so assuming no cross-border effects, 
market penetration is unchanged.  The estimated penetration in Bangladesh indicates that market 
saturation would likely have been reached with the effect of a CMC, as over 89 million new 
active borrowers are added to the original figure, which is excessive given a total population in 
Bangladesh of about 164 million.  The other significant addition of active borrowers is in India, 
where more than ten million new borrowers are serviced, allowing the penetration estimate to 
jump from 6.5% to 8.7%.  Nepal enjoys a modest increase, and Pakistan adds only a few 
thousand new borrowers.   
 
With the simulation complete, we can now address the questions posed at the beginning of 
section 4.1.4.  Of course, these results are dependent upon the accuracy of the calibration, the 
parameters chosen, and the absence of any complicating factors that may not be considered.  
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However, to the extent that these factors are minimal, some summary results may be offered to 
these questions:  
 
How many extra borrowers would be served?  By comparing tables 4.1.3.1 and 4.1.4.1, the 
estimated number of originations is extraordinary.  Where the microcredit market in South Asia 
grew from an estimated 2.5 million loans to 63 million loans over the decade, expansion of this 
activity by a SACMC would have possibly allowed this level to be reached in just two years 
rather than eight, achieving six times the number of loans over the period.   
 
What would the differential effects be across the nations?  Would market saturation be reached 
anywhere?  We can see that Bangladesh would have reached a point of market saturation, while 
Afghanistan and Sri Lanka would be unaffected, due to the underdevelopment of MFIs there.  
This is a consistent outcome with the main focus of the CMC, which is to accelerate the 
progression of microcredit markets, rather than to offer nascent growth in regions where there is 
little or none.  Again, the innovations in microlending are expected to come from local lenders.  
Therefore, the CMC is not in a position to guarantee expansion of microcredit everywhere; 
rather, it serves to reward successful efforts where they arise.   
 
How would the expansion of investor dollars compare to the total asset balances already in place 
in microfinance institutions?  Assets of South Asian MFIs grew to $10 billion by 2010.  With the 
CMC, this would have been roughly $16 billion.  This is a rather modest increase in percentage 
terms, but as discussed, the increase in origination activity would have been much larger.  The 
investor dollars committed to lending activity would have reached $26 billion in 2010.  These 
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numbers suggest that new dollars introduced to the market via CMC securitizations may be more 
efficient in achieving market completion than those placed on the balance sheets of MFIs.  
Where a new loan is originated for every $156 of assets with an MFI in South Asia, a loan can be 
generated with just $99 of investor purchases of CMC securities.   
 
1.4.1.5     Viability of CMC Securities 
The parameterization of the simulation suggested that a CMC security over this decade would 
have provided a geometric return of 9.37% to investors, with a standard deviation of returns of 
just 2.36%.  Again, this simulation allowed the CMC just one level of f and p for the year, 
regardless of the continual performance of loans and loan payment remittance.   
 





Clearly, if investors were willing to place a social premium on CMC security returns, it may be 
feasible for the CMC to increase its discount rate to encourage more participation.  Such a 
marked differential in performance between participating and nonparticipating MFIs perhaps 
would, in the presence of the CMC, encourage best practices and adoption of efficiencies among 
smaller organizations that may further spur growth of the microfinance industry.   
 
The behavior of the CMC securities varies significantly with the choice of the parameter k.  At 
lower levels, the assumed variance in the CMC security is very low, allowing for a lower optimal 
choice of f
*
.  However, returns are lower, given that this makes origination sales viable for a 
greater subset of MFIs, adding lower performance loans to the average.   
 
It is also important to note that the number of new loans generated varies widely with the choice 
of the k parameter.  Although it appears that a higher estimate is more beneficial to the CMC in 
achieving its goal, this is not the case.  Figure 4.1.5.1 shows satisfaction of the constraint.  But 
the goal of increased loan takeup falls rapidly at higher levels of k.  In fact, recall that the CMC's 
simulated activity provided an additional 1.3 billion loans to the microcredit markets in southeast 
Asia during the ten year period, given the choice of k = 0.1.  If this parameter was k = 0.12 
instead, the estimated number of new loans would be less than half of this figure.  This 
demonstrates, perhaps most clearly, the importance of organizing microloans into a diversified, 





1.5     Conclusion 
As we start to seriously consider the viability of an organization such as the South Asia Central 
Microcredit Clearinghouse, many aspects of its size, structure, form, management, missions, and 
scope should be the subject of discussion.  It's organization as a nonprofit arose from a logical 
analysis of the challenges confronting the potential of a microloan securitization market, and 
future work will determine if this is indeed the correct organizational form for a CMC.   
 
A legal analysis is required.  Only an introduction to this important contribution is provided here, 
but a detailed legal opinion would contribute a great deal to this initial effort.  The development 
of a tailored CMC software system would show operational viability.  Leading MFIs from the 
region could provide insight as to whether this effort would be a welcome addition to their 
financing options.  Investors would need to be convinced of the strength and backing of a CMC 
security.   
 
While a large MFI might be the logical point for the spawning of a prototype CMC, 
independence is arguably of importance.  It would likely be most beneficial to the sustainability 
of the program to have its origination minimally connected with a specific MFI, but rather a 
project of an NGO with a mission of poverty alleviation that is itself not a direct lender.  Starting 
with one CMC, perhaps in South Asia, would provide a springboard to other regional CMCs 
beginning operation in other parts of the world as microfinance services continue to  develop.   
 
A CMC would not contest the desire of MiCDOs.  Diversified lending to MFIs has served as a 
useful bridge between some investors and microlenders.  While MiCDOs are arguably the best 
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way of funding MFIs within the framework of a traditional financial tool set, I have shown here 
that a near-direct securitization of microloans is possible, with the help of a regional nonprofit 
organization to serve as a Central Microcredit Clearinghouse.   
 
With the aid of a CMC, regional MFIs could have greater access to investor funds by allowing 
them the "pure play" on the underlying asset, which is attractive to many foreign investors.  
Local MFIs would themselves hold some securities as partners of the securitization program.  
Loans to impoverished citizens would be expanded.  Profits of MFIs would rise.  The existence 
of a CMC would allow the securitization of microloans to be a sustainable and socially beneficial 
reality.  The organization at the center of these solutions may indeed usher in a new chapter in 
microcredit capital market access.  If successful, perhaps we could witness this industry moving 
into a competitive equilibrium in years, rather than decades.   
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Chapter 1 Appendix A 
Cash at discrete times 
 





























1  assumes that 
cash is zero.  That is, imagine that the MFI gets all payments on the first of every month exactly 
at noon, then immediately re-loans that money to new borrowers waiting at the door.  The instant 
that time t-1 becomes time t is at noon on the first.  At time t, the money has come in, gone out, 
and cash is zero again.  This is why there's no return on past cash.   
 
Alternatively, we could reformulate the equation so that time t is exactly at noon on the first of 
that month, in that split second when cash is moving from the inbox to the outbox.  In this case, 




































Now, cash is a positive balance each period; payments have just come in, they are about to go 
out, but haven't quite yet.  The last origination was now last period, so the final term is indexed 
as t-1.  Also, the cash return is not multiplied by t-1 cash, but by t-1 cash that was unused as 
originations and related fees.   
 
Given these options, I opted for the former.   
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Chapter 1 Appendix B 
Existence of bounded roots for (3.2.1.4) 
 
It is necessary that (3.2.1.4) yield both an Imax and Imin when this inequality holds with equality, 
so that an interior maximizing value I
*
 also exists.  Here, I show the existence of these two real 
values.  I have assumed that there is positive demand for funds which is everywhere 
differentiable and decreasing in I.  Also, there is a positive default rate which is everywhere 
differentiable and increasing in I (up to some finite value of I where d(I) = 1, the area beyond 
which is trivial).  Also, negative interest rates are assumed to not exist.  Given these assumptions, 
for a given interest rate I, there must exist some value of origination cost w such that  
 
 






This value is found as  
       111  IdIIgw m  
It is possible, if      111  IdI m , that the value of w that allows this equality is negative.  
However, the origination cost w is assumed to be greater than zero.  Therefore, given some 
functions of g(I) and d(I), it is possible that (3.2.1.4) does not hold.  This is simply the condition 














so that lending is profitable for the MFI, and occurs.  As w increases, the left hand side is 
reduced, and this inequality moves toward equality.  There is, therefore, some maximum real 















At this level of origination cost, the growth factor is R, and the MFI is indifferent between 
microlending and investment in the risk-free asset.  However, we can return to (3.2.1.4), taking 
the first derivative of the GF with respect to w: 















This value is clearly negative, showing that decreasing origination costs allow for a larger 
growth factor.  Therefore, when origination costs are below the maximum, interest rates may be 
lowered.  At an interest rate of zero, (3.2.1.4) clearly becomes zero.  The intermediate value 
theorem therefore provides for the existance of some value Imin that allows (3.2.1.4) to hold with 
equality.   
 
Since the default function d(I) = 1 for some finite value of I, this interest rate level also forces the 
growth factor to be zero.  Once again, the intermediate value theorem dictates that there then 
must exist some value Imax for which the growth factor is equal to R.  Again, it is not important 
that these are the only two roots, but that these roots exist as growth factor minimums.  The 
assumptions made then allow for the growth factor to be convex and differentiable, creating the 
growth factor maximizing interest rate level I* as provided by (3.2.1.8).   
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Chapter 2 
Disbursements of ODA:  




I analyze Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitment and disbursement activity in 
terms of motivation, considering that the difference between bilateral aid commitments and 
disbursements may be related to the business cycle of the donor country.  A cumulative 
commitment variable is calculated for 23 donor countries and 151 recipient nations, over a 41 
year period of 1970-2010, as well as the sub-period of 1991-2010.  Cyclicality of aid is briefly 
analyzed first, with mixed results of procyclicality that depend on the business cycle proxy.  The 
annual disbursement gap is calculated for each pair for each year, as well as a cumulative 
disbursement gap, and these are regressed against multiple cyclicality measures of income and a 
set of control variables.  It is found in multiple specifications that the cumulative disbursement 
gap is generally procyclical, much as aid itself, although the cyclicality of aid depends on the 
cyclicality measure.  This is confirmed with four extensions designed mainly as robustness 




2.1     Introduction 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been a long-debated subject in terms of both 
effectiveness and motivation.  Suggested motivations of nations to engage in bilateral foreign aid 
are numerous.  McKinlay & Little (1977) recognized the main motivations of bilateral foreign 
aid as a dichotomy of the desire to truly help a recipient nation, and the goal of imperialism and 
donor self-interest, finding some evidence of the latter for some aid during the 1960s.  Many 
agree that one of the main motivations of aid appears to be the donor's own interest (Berthelemy 
& Tichit, 2004; Berthelemy, 2006; Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Nielsen, 2009), including the desire 
to strengthen political relationships, trade interests, and influence within the recipient nation 
(Maizels & Nissanke, 1984).  Additionally, political variables, such as a shift within the donor 
nation's conservative regime, is shown to be related to aid flows to poor nations (McGillivray & 
Oczkowski, 1992; Tingley, 2010).   
 
It is noted that corruption does not appear to deter aid; also, aid does not appear to deter 
corruption (Svensson, 1997; Alesina & Weber, 1999).  However, other factors of the recipient 
country have been isolated as relating to aid flows, such as population of the recipient country.  
Smaller countries are noted for receiving more aid.  This is often explained as donors perhaps 
feeling a greater effect to their aid; however, this effect is greatly diminished with control 
variables for exports and political dummies (Dudley & Montmarquette, 1976).    
 
The timing of aid has been shown to be important in the management of a developing economy.  
Unpredictability of aid can cause a recipient nation to remain in a low-level equilibrium trap 
(Eifert & Gelb, WP).  It has specifically been found to lower investment (Hudson & Mosley, 
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2008).  This variability has been found to be procyclical in studies of the relationship between 
aid and the business cycle, including commitments (Dabla-Norris, Minoiu, & Zanna 2010).  
However, commitments have been noted as somewhat less procyclical (Pallage & Robe, 2001).   
 
Bulíř & Hamann (2008) also point to variability of aid as a culprit in making macroeconomies of 
the poorest nations harder to manage, and demonstrate that one driver of this variation is the 
difference between aid commitments and disbursements.  This difference comes (at least in part) 
by the structure of donor governments; the agencies approving aid are often not the same as 
those disbursing the aid.  It can take several years for a commitment to be disbursed.  A 
commitment is recorded as disbursed when financial resources are transferred to the recipient, or 
in the case of services, when payment is made to the provider of the service (oecd.org).   
 
The difference between commitments and disbursements has been shown to change over time.  
Bulíř & Hamann (2008) show, using loan data the World Bank's Global Development Finance 
database, that the ratio of loan commitments to disbursements fell throughout the 1980s, for 
instance, but then stabilize to about 1.5.  Further, the disparity appears greater with regard to the 
lowest-income recipients.  This gap between promises and action, also known as the 
unpredictability of aid, is perhaps not only motivated by bureaucracy, but perhaps also by fiscal 
balances, credit stance, and the overall business cycle of the donor nation.  These relationships, 
and the timing of cumulative differences between foreign aid commitments and disbursements, 
are the focus of this paper.  Using OECD data on foreign aid grants, loans, and total aid, this 
disparity will be analyzed with respect to several relevant variables.   
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Multiple research questions arise as testable assumptions with regard to the behavior of 
commitments and disbursements with regard to the business cycle.  First, several past studies 
have shown aid to be generally procyclical with respect to donor income; will the same be found 
in the present dataset?  Second, is the simple difference between commitments and 
disbursements in a given year correlated with donor income, indicating that a donor's failure to 
pay immediately may be related to economic downturn?  Third, can we find similar results by 
looking at a cumulative measure of foreign aid commitments payable?  Finally, are the results we 
find robust to varying parameterizations and control variables?  
 
While the analysis of the disbursement gap is atheoretic, this initial analysis assumes that there 
may be some function that describes the disbursement gap, such as  
 
 drdrd FiscSurpYYCYCCYCfCDG ,,,,  
 
where a cumulative disbursement gap is related to the cyclicality of income for the donor and 
recipient, the level of income for the donor and recipient, and the fiscal surplus of the donor 
nation.  The nature of this work will be exploratory, looking for empirical relationships among 
these variables, in multiple measures, that are robust. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Part 2 presents the data which has been 
gathered for the present analysis.  Part 3 discusses the methods of analysis employed in utilizing 
the data to help us answer the research questions presented Part 4 concludes. 
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2.2     Data 
Most data was obtained from stats.oecd.org.  This website offers data on GDP, ODA 
commitments, ODA disbursements, and myriad other data.  Data was obtained on annual totals 
for 1966-2010 on ODA grant commitments and disbursements, ODA loan commitments and 
disbursements, and ODA total commitments and disbursements.  These were obtained for each 
of 23 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, and 151 recipient nations, classified 
by stats.oecd as either Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Low Income Countries (LICs), Low 
Middle Income Countries (LMICs), or Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs).  The 
measurement chosen for each of these datasets was 2010 constant prices in USD.  Full time 
employment percentages were also obtained from stats.oecd for each of the 23 DAC nations, 
using national definitions of employment, as well as budget surpluses as a percentage of GDP for 
these 23 nations.  A number of foreign aid components are available for analysis, including six 
types of commitments and 22 types of disbursements.  Of these, Total Grants, Total Gross 
Loans, and Total Net ODA were chosen for analysis.  Grant commitments and loan 
commitments together comprise 99.6% of total net ODA committed.   
 
Data on national income was obtained from unctadstat.unctad.org, the website of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development.  This dataset contained annual GDP per capita 
figures in 2005 constant prices, in USD.  This dataset supplied income figures for both the donor 
and recipient nations under analysis.   
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From each of the three ODA strands of grants (G), loans (L), and total (T), differences were 
calculated between the commitments (C) and disbursements (D) for each donor (d) and recipient 
(r) pairing for each year y.   
DiffGdry = CGdry - DGdry 
DiffLdry = CLdry - DLdry 
DiffTdry = CTdry - DTdry 
For each element in this matrix where the donor did not fully disburse what was committed in a 
given year, these difference variables are positive.  It is reasonable to expect lags in 
disbursements.  The OECD library provides an accounting of what they consider a commitment 
to foreign aid: "Commitments are considered to be made at the date a loan or grant agreement is 
signed or the obligation is otherwise made known to the recipient."  This is not to be confused 
with a pledge, which is merely an announcement of intent to deliver foreign aid.  Although the 
commitment is a signed obligation, it may take several years to disburse the funds, and in fact, 
recent studies show that a significant amount of funds are not disbursed, as discussed in the 
introduction. Because of this, cumulative measures of undisbursed commitments SumDiffGdry, 
SumDiffGdry, and SumDiffTdry are also calculated, so that analyses may be performed in search of 

























Cumulative differences will not be generally comparable or even meaningful on a standalone 
basis, given irregularities in the supply of data that force some nations to "begin" after others.  
Although some data is available for the full 45 year span from 1966 through 2010, other data is 
either limited or missing completely for certain nations.  The same calculations were also 
performed for the sub-period of 1991-2010 for comparison.   
 
General information on ODA components by donor is available in Table 1.  Nations are sorted 
into two groups: original OECD nations, and then more recent entrants and non-OECD donor 
nations.   

















Austria $14,334  $13,196  $8,685  $5,974  $23,018  $15,613  1.47 
Belgium $28,470  $30,775  $3,739  $3,763  $32,184  $33,321  0.97 
Canada $65,662  $60,625  $16,596  $12,200  $82,261  $67,987  1.21 
Denmark $29,938  $32,285  $5,927  $5,452  $35,865  $34,793  1.03 
France $153,110  $161,125  $92,812  $73,346  $246,648  $197,190  1.25 
Germany $154,843  $147,047  $104,067  $87,940  $258,964  $184,423  1.4 
Greece $2,322  $2,322  $25  $25  $2,347  $2,347  1 
Ireland $5,513  $5,703  $0  $0  $5,513  $5,703  0.97 
Italy $46,343  $40,770  $38,105  $29,174  $79,457  $57,577  1.38 
Luxembourg $2,652  $2,937  $0  $0  $2,652  $2,937  0.9 
Netherlands $77,813  $77,426  $14,128  $12,255  $91,941  $81,811  1.12 
Norway $42,452  $44,734  $825  $1,042  $43,278  $45,674  0.95 
Portugal $3,839  $4,595  $1,807  $3,239  $5,647  $7,056  0.8 
Spain $20,328  $23,598  $11,437  $14,846  $31,765  $33,158  0.96 
Sweden $45,203  $45,059  $1,537  $1,437  $46,740  $45,855  1.02 
Switzerland $24,569  $23,871  $1,473  $1,509  $26,061  $24,735  1.05 
U.K. $108,354  $104,886  $26,874  $26,483  $137,001  $115,940  1.18 
U.S. $404,778  $347,851  $106,677  $108,595  $523,307  $400,018  1.31 
        
Australia $67,266  $65,557  $569  $465  $67,865  $65,942  1.03 
Finland $11,438  $9,712  $1,078  $847  $12,517  $10,099  1.24 
Japan $144,762  $140,748  $317,396  $242,882  $462,161  $270,176  1.71 
Korea $3,120  $2,684  $7,081  $2,606  $10,201  $5,021  2.03 
N. Zealand $5,082  $5,054  $45  $52  $5,126  $5,092  1.01 
TOTAL $1,462,191  $1,392,560  $760,883  $634,132  $2,232,519  $1,712,468  1.3 
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Table 1 allows us to see some relative differences in DAC nations as far as foreign aid volume 
and type over the 45-year period.  We can also calculate from this table that 95% of grant 
commitments, 83% of loan commitments, and 77% of total commitments were disbursed in this 
period.  This is not conclusive evidence of a lack of follow-through to ODA commitments; 
indeed, some disbursements are known to take time, and some of the most recent commitments 
may remain undisbursed simply due to normal timing issues.  Therefore, analyses in the next 
section will take this into account.   
 





as % of GDP 
Avg. Loan 
Commitments 
as % of GDP 
Avg. Total 
Commitments 
as % of GDP 
Austria 0.13% 0.09% 0.22% 
Belgium 0.25% 0.04% 0.29% 
Canada 0.21% 0.07% 0.27% 
Denmark 0.35% 0.08% 0.43% 
France 0.22% 0.14% 0.36% 
Germany 0.16% 0.12% 0.28% 
Greece 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 
Ireland 0.08% 0.00% 0.08% 
Italy 0.08% 0.05% 0.13% 
Luxembourg 0.19% 0.00% 0.19% 
Netherlands 0.41% 0.09% 0.50% 
Norway 0.48% 0.01% 0.49% 
Portugal 0.05% 0.03% 0.08% 
Spain 0.05% 0.03% 0.07% 
Sweden 0.42% 0.01% 0.43% 
Switzerland 0.18% 0.01% 0.20% 
U.K. 0.16% 0.04% 0.20% 
U.S. 0.11% 0.04% 0.14% 
    
Australia 0.35% 0.00% 0.35% 
Finland 0.19% 0.02% 0.21% 
Japan 0.09% 0.22% 0.32% 
Korea 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 
N. Zealand 0.16% 0.00% 0.16% 
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Table 2b: Summary Statistics of Foreign Aid, 1966 - 2010 
DAC 
Nation 
% of Grant 
Commitments 
undisbursed 
% of Loan 
Commitments 
undisbursed 
% of Total 
Commitments 
undisbursed 
Austria 7.90% 31.20% 32.20% 
Belgium -8.10% -0.60% -3.50% 
Canada 7.70% 26.50% 17.40% 
Denmark -7.80% 8.00% 3.00% 
France -5.20% 21.00% 20.10% 
Germany 5.00% 15.50% 28.80% 
Greece 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Ireland -3.40% 0.00% -3.40% 
Italy 12.00% 23.40% 27.50% 
Luxembourg -10.70% 0.00% -10.70% 
Netherlands 0.50% 13.30% 11.00% 
Norway -5.40% -26.30% -5.50% 
Portugal -19.70% -79.30% -25.00% 
Spain -16.10% -29.80% -4.40% 
Sweden 0.30% 6.50% 1.90% 
Switzerland 2.80% -2.40% 5.10% 
U.K. 3.20% 1.50% 15.40% 
U.S. 14.10% -1.80% 23.60% 
    
Australia 2.50% 18.30% 2.80% 
Finland 15.10% 21.40% 19.30% 
Japan 2.80% 23.50% 41.50% 
Korea 14.00% 63.20% 50.80% 
N. Zealand 0.50% -16.10% 0.70% 
 
 
Tables 2a and 2b provide another viewpoint of initial comparison and general orientation.  Here 
it is evident that the absolute numbers in Table 1 don't provide us with information comparable 
to that of the relative figures of Table 2a.  For example, five nations committed in excess of 
$100,000 in this period, and while this generosity is not to be ignored, the highest total aid 
committed as a fraction of national income was by four different nations not on this short list of 
five; they are Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.   
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Table 2b informs us of commitments that were not disbursed, and of those countries disbursing 
aid in excess of commitments.  We can see that there is a much greater volatility of loan 
disbursements as a percentage of commitments relative to that of grants.   
 
















% of GDP 
# years of 
Budget 
Surplus 
Austria 88.20% 2.50% 4 -2.10% 4 
Belgium 84.90% 2.20% 4 -5.60% 2 
Canada 82.80% 2.90% 3 -2.80% 12 
Denmark 77.50% 1.90% 8 -0.50% 17 
France 87.70% 2.30% 4 -3.20% 7 
Germany 82.30% 2.00% 5 -2.80% 22 
Greece 95.00% 2.40% 9 -5.40% 1 
Ireland 88.10% 4.10% 4 -4.40% 10 
Italy 92.60% 2.00% 5 -6.70% 0 
Luxembourg 90.00% 3.80% 3 1.80% 35 
Netherlands 70.50% 2.50% 3 -2.80% 6 
Norway 73.30% 3.10% 2 6.00% 38 
Portugal 91.00% 2.90% 7 -5.20% 6 
Spain 92.50% 2.90% 4 -2.70% 5 
Sweden 76.60% 2.10% 7 5.80% 20 
Switzerland 70.50% 1.60% 7 -1.10% 23 
United 
Kingdom 
76.30% 2.20% 7 -3.10% 5 
United States 83.00% 2.90% 7 -3.30% 3 
      
Australia 80.20% 3.20% 2 -1.70% 10 
Finland 89.90% 2.60% 5 2.30% 31 
Japan  2.60% 6 -3.00% 8 
Korea  7.30% 2 2.10% 37 
New Zealand 82.40% 2.30% 6 0.50% 29 
 
In the next section, a cyclical derivative of GDP will be used to measure correlations with aid 
flows, to determine cyclicality of aid.  Employment is also used as a correlate with aid flows, for 
a second business cycle proxy.  Government budget surpluses as a percent of GDP will be used 
with disbursement gap regressions as a control variable.  Table 3 presents some basic 
information about these variables for the same period of 1966 - 2010, (although GDP figures are 
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only from 1970 -2010).  As noted earlier, unemployment is measured using national definitions, 
so international comparisons are not meaningful.  However, it is the annual percentage point 
change that will be used for analysis, so this comparison is unnecessary.   
 
2.3     Methods of Analysis and Results 
This section explains and compares the methods used in estimating movements in the business 
cycle, calculation of cumulative aid commitments, and tests of pro-cyclicality.  Results of these 
tests are presented, and the section ends with three extensions used as robustness checks on the 
baseline analyses. 
 
2.3.1     The Business Cycle 
Business cycle fluctuations are measured with several proxies.  One standard method of 
calculation is a simple deviation from detrended GDP per capita, using a detrending technique 
such as the Hodrick & Prescott (1997) filter, which is built on the assumption that a time-series 
variable yt is composed of a growth (trend) component gt and a cyclical component ct such that yt 
= gt + ct for t = 1,...,T.  These components are calculated with minimization of the expression: 











2   
A smooth trend would indicate a near-constant growth figure; therefore, the difference between 
growth and lagged growth for two consecutive periods should be very small.  The HP filter 
accounts for this by squaring this difference, and applying a multiplier λ on the sum of these 
squares.  A higher choice of λ then "penalizes" changes in the growth component over time.  
There appears to be little consensus about the choice of this parameter for annual data; suggested 
estimates range from a low of 6.5 (Ravn & Uhlig, 2002) or 10 (Backus & Kehoe, 1992) to 100 
 70 
(Pallage & Robe, 2001).  To ensure that results are robust to the choice of this parameterization, I 
will begin by showing results for all three of these values on per-capita GDP levels.  The final 
cyclicality measure is then the natural log of the per-capita GDP level in time t minus the natural 
log of the HP trend component g.  I will refer to this cyclicality measure in time t as HPλt, where 
λ is the smoothing parameter chosen in the Hodrick-Prescott filter: 
   ttt gGDPHP lnln   
 
Another popular proxy for the business cycle, especially among developed nations, is the Output 
Gap provided by Beffy et al., (2006).  This methodology and resulting figures as provided by 
OECD is the difference between real and potential output as calculated using the nation's capital 
stock, potential labor force, and assuming a constant inflation rate.  The output gap is highly 
correlated with the HP cyclicality component, as shown in table 4 below.   
 





HP6.5 HP10 HP100 
OECD Output Gap 1    
HP6.5 0.773 1   
HP10 0.806 0.996 1  
HP100 0.884 0.852 0.892 1 
 
We can see that the relationship between the Output Gap is highly correlated with the HP filters, 
especially at higher levels of the smoothing parameter.  As the Output gap is built from a 
theoretical base of production rather than a simple smoothing of actual national income, it will 
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serve as more of a standard in subsequent analyses in measurement of business cycles and 
shocks.
27
   
 
2.3.2     Cyclicality of Aid 
It has been generally found that aid tends to be pro-cyclical with donor income.  While not the 
focus of this paper, I begin by testing the cyclicality of commitments to confirm this finding in 
the current dataset.  Beginning with per-capital donor GDP in constant USD, each series is 
detrended with the HP filter, creating HP6.5, HP10, and HP100 as shown in the previous section.  
The OECD output gap is also used as a 4th sample of GDP cyclicality.   
 
Recipient income, for purposes of subsequent analyses, is also detrended using the HP filter.  A 
low parameter value of λ=1, following Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) to allow for shorter business 
cycles.  The proxy for recipient cyclicality of income is then HP1.  The majority of bilateral aid 
flows are "missing values," of which nearly all are zeroes.  It is not uncommon to then regard 
these data points as zero aid flows, rather than to ignore them as missing values (Arndt et al. 
2010; Dabla-Norris et al., 2010).  This assumption is also used presently.  Further, the OLS 
regression coefficients can be considered elasticities if aid flows are transformed using a semi-
log form: 
   drydrydry GGsignG  1ln
 
   drydrydry LLsignL  1ln
 
   drydrydry TTsignT  1ln  
                                                 
27
 This is true for donor nations, where OECD output gap data is available.  Recipient nations 
must be analyzed with HP filtered GDP levels.   
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These detrended donor series were all correlated with each component of transformed recipient 
aid.  Most correlations were insignificant, given the small number of observation points for each 
pairing.  Only correlations that were significant at the α = 0.05 level were retained.  The number 
of remaining correlations, divided into positive and negative correlations, are shown in Table 5 
for each category of summary data, out of the possible 3,519 donor/recipient pairings.   
 

















# pos. 64 74 37 59 70 83 
# neg. 195 237 44 69 200 243 
λ = 6.5 
# pos. 45 41 29 26 52 46 
# neg. 31 27 29 19 36 29 
λ = 10 
# pos. 52 45 32 30 59 51 
# neg. 31 33 28 21 37 34 
λ = 100 
# pos. 107 77 26 44 108 95 
# neg. 60 77 32 35 66 83 
 
 
It is clear that the choice of the lambda parameter affects the proportion of GDP variation that is 
"claimed" for the cyclical component, causing higher parameter values to generally result in a 
greater number of significant correlations.  Interestingly, even though the parameter value of 
λ=100 allowed income cyclicality to be correlated most closely with the OECD output gap, 
evidence regarding the procyclicality of aid using these two measures is contradictory.  Use of 
the OECD output gap shows commitments, disbursements, and bilateral aid totals to be 
decidedly more countercyclical.  For example, 75% of total disbursement observations 
significantly correlated to the OECD output gap are negatively correlated.  The HP filtered 
cyclicality measures, however, tend to show slight procyclicality for these aid flows at low 
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parameter values, and this preponderance grows as the lambda value increases.  The exception to 
this is the ambiguous procyclicality of HP filter correlations that relate to loan commitments.   
 
The HP cyclicality measure is a popularly used proxy for the business cycle, and the OECD 
output gap is quickly becoming more of an accepted standard, especially for donor nations.  
However, it may be interesting to look at a third relative measure, such as the simple annual 
change in employment.  This variable was also calculated for each donor nation, for the years 
1970-2008.  The results of bilateral aid flow correlations with this variable are shown in Table 6.  
Again, some procyclicality is demonstrated, as a positive change in employment in a donor 
nation is more often correlated with aid.  Interestingly, grants and total bilateral aid flows are 
found to be somewhat procyclical here, in accordance with analyses in Table 5 using the HP 
measure.  Loan amounts appear countercyclical, more in line with the OECD output gap.   
 














# pos. 118 161 19 24 125 159 
# neg. 118 129 58 69 114 117 
 
We may opt to explore the data just a bit deeper at this point to examine whether, as purported in 
past empirical works, the procyclicality of aid is particularly strong with respect to lower income 
countries.  The 153 recipient nations can easily be subdivided per the OECD classifications of 
Least Developed Countries (LCDs), Low Income Countries (LICs), Low Middle Income 
Countries (LMICs), and Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs).  With these four categories 
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of recipients in groupings, we can repeat the analyses of Tables 5 and 6 to answer this question 
with the current dataset.   
 
















# pos. 21 27 11 24 20 29 
# neg. 69 85 8 18 68 89 
LICs 
# pos. 1 1 7 2 3 2 
# neg. 14 17 5 7 15 13 
LMICs 
# pos. 19 24 15 25 22 28 
# neg. 62 75 21 33 65 81 
UMICs 
# pos. 23 22 4 8 25 24 




















# pos. 15 11 11 8 16 14 
# neg. 12 9 4 7 13 9 
LICs 
# pos. 2 3 3 1 4 5 
# neg. 1 0 2 1 3 1 
LMICs 
# pos. 14 14 10 11 16 13 
# neg. 9 9 13 9 9 11 
UMICs 
# pos. 14 13 5 6 16 14 




















# pos. 17 13 12 9 18 17 
# neg. 12 9 3 7 13 9 
LICs 
# pos. 3 4 3 1 6 6 
# neg. 0 0 3 1 1 1 
LMICs 
# pos. 17 15 12 14 18 14 
# neg. 11 12 13 8 12 14 
UMICs 
# pos. 15 13 5 6 18 14 
# neg. 8 12 9 5 10 10 
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# pos. 31 21 9 17 32 27 
# neg. 18 21 7 11 17 22 
LICs 
# pos. 7 4 2 1 9 6 
# neg. 3 4 6 4 5 4 
LMICs 
# pos. 36 25 10 18 35 32 
# neg. 24 29 8 11 25 34 
UMICs 
# pos. 33 27 5 8 32 30 




















# pos. 36 62 6 8 42 62 
# neg. 32 38 15 16 39 35 
LICs 
# pos. 16 20 2 5 18 19 
# neg. 17 17 5 9 17 13 
LMICs 
# pos. 37 46 7 8 38 47 
# neg. 41 47 26 30 38 36 
UMICs 
# pos. 29 33 4 3 27 31 
# neg. 28 27 12 14 30 33 
 
A similar dichotomy is shown in Tables 5a-5d and 6a, where the OECD output gap tends to 
show the opposite relationship with most aid flows than does the cyclicality measure derived 
from the HP filter.  Focusing on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the output gap has more 
significantly negative correlations with most bilateral aid flow types, indicating a tendency to be 
countercyclical.  These same transformed aid flows to the poorest countries are more correlated 
with HP income procyclicality, again with generally stronger ratios as the parameter is increased.  
Table 5 shows that employment changes are also positively correlated with bilateral aid flows to 
the poorest countries, providing more evidence for procyclicality.   
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2.3.3     Undisbursed Commitments 
The main focus of this paper is to examine the difference between commitments and 
disbursements, and to explore whether this difference is related to the business cycle of the donor 
country.  We can start by noting that Table 2 gives us a clear picture of the variance between 
nations with regard to undisbursed commitments.  Some nations, such as Korea, allow up to half 
of their committed foreign aid to remain undisbursed during this time period, while other nations 
such as Luxembourg and Portugal actually give substantially more aid than they promise.  It is 
quite likely that these differences rest on multiple variables, only a few of which will be 
explored.  But any overall measure of undisbursed commitments would average these fixed 
effects, losing much information about these overall differences between nations.   
 
The differences of DiffGdry, DiffLdry, and DiffTdry have been calculated as shown, and have also 
undergone the semi-log transformation used for previous aid figures.  The results are now 
correlated with the OECD output gap as the business cycle proxy, as were the six individual aid 
flows themselves.  The correlations for each donor nation are shown in Table 7.   
 
With Table 7, we can see a marked difference between the cyclicality of bilateral aid flows and 
the payment of committed bilateral aid flows.  Recall from section 3.2 that the aid flows were 
consistently shown to be countercyclical in correlations with the OECD output gap.  Here, the 
output gap is generally procyclically correlated with disbursement gaps.  The majority of 
























Austria -0.216 -0.031 0.128 -0.111 0.209 0.054 
Belgium 0.237 -0.020 0.191 0.280
*
 0.091 0.242 
Canada 0.137 -0.075 0.178 0.156 0.237 0.364
**
 
Denmark 0.140 0.152 0.053 0.128 0.040 0.270
*
 





 -0.146 -0.279 -0.168 0.045 -0.107 
Greece   0.055    
Ireland       
Italy -0.240 0.029 0.110 -0.178 -0.099 -0.173 












 0.226 0.091 0.032 0.098 
Portugal 0.001 -0.282 -0.117 -0.012 -0.382
**
 -0.126 
Spain -0.053 0.196 0.391
**
 -0.053 -0.113 0.237 















United States 0.223 0.249 0.063 0.111 0.082 0.144 












 0.041 0.201 0.123 
Japan -0.102 0.178 -0.021 0.013 -0.066 -0.069 
Korea       
New Zealand -0.112  -0.112 0.040  0.040 
 Significance of these correlations at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels  
are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
In the right three columns, the same calculations are shown for just the 49 LDCs, in case a 
similar bias was found as in Tables 4a and 5a.  Because of the relatively small number of 
disbursement gaps, few of the correlations are highly significant.  It is not clear from browsing 
this grid of numbers whether the disbursement gaps are necessarily more procyclical for LDCs, 
but 70% these of correlations are positive, comparable to 69% for the entire sample.  A simple 
average of these correlations across numbers provides only about 0.080 for total aid, and 0.082 
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for LDCs.  This provides an indication that LDCs are not significantly disadvantaged in this 
regard.   
 
At this point, the subperiod of 1991-2010 is introduced to test for differences in analyses 
covering the entire 41-year time span, and the most recent 20-year span.  In Table 7b, the same 
output is generated for this limited time period.   
 




















Austria -0.300 0.142 0.039 -0.142 0.177 0.033 
Belgium -0.053 -0.155 -0.030 -0.050 0.093 0.092 





Denmark 0.164 0.089 -0.130 0.055 -0.467
**
 0.027 
France 0.340 -0.014 0.156 0.313 -0.338 0.116 
Germany -0.400
*
 -0.146 -0.279 -0.168 0.045 -0.107 
Greece   0.125    
Ireland       
Italy 0.016 0.391
*
 0.348 -0.087 0.315 0.192 
Luxembourg -0.294  -0.294 0.306  0.306 
Netherlands 0.329 -0.069 0.271 0.352  0.364 
Norway -0.061 -0.533
**
 -0.117 -0.218 0.024 -0.206 
Portugal 0.044 -0.453
**
 -0.194 0.015 -0.608
***
 -0.191 
Spain -0.052 0.286 0.483
**
 -0.050 -0.209 0.258 
Sweden -0.016 0.260 -0.086 -0.042 -0.244 -0.046 
Switzerland 0.378
*
 0.351 0.338 0.196  0.179 
United Kingdom 0.113 -0.212 0.520
**
 -0.016 -0.123 0.218 
United States 0.246 0.432
*
 -0.066 0.034 0.229 -0.197 
       
Australia 0.269 0.230 0.270 0.358  0.358 
Finland 0.181 0.160 0.194 0.111 0.285 0.186 
Japan 0.126 -0.038 -0.128 0.120 0.281 0.174 
Korea       
New Zealand -0.139  -0.139 -0.005  -0.005 
 Significance of these correlations at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels  
are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
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The average correlation in this subsample drops with the earliest years removed, to 0.053 for the 
entire sample, and 0.059 for the LDC countries.  A reduction in procyclicality of the 
disbursement gap is also indicated by the raw count of positive correlations.  Where the 41-year 
sample showed 69% of correlations to be positive, this subsample shows just 58% of correlations 
to be positive.   
 
2.3.4     Cumulative Undisbursed Commitments 
A simple comparison of commitments and disbursements from year to year provided some 
evidence that the business cycle is related to the timing of fund disbursements.  Some evidence 
was found for procyclicality for the disbursement gap in the previous section.  However, what 
may be more telling is the cumulative undisbursed funds committed from each donor to each 
recipient.  To facilitate this, a simple variable of cumulative normalized commitments, Ccum, is 
calculated for each donor/recipient pairing for each year.  Again, a semi-log transformation of 
this cumulative undisbursed balance is used in analyses.   
 
We may again run correlations in order to search for a simple preponderance of positive or 
negative values, with few significant results.  However, a multivariate regression of this 
distribution gap over the 41-year period and 20-year subperiod would allow us to include control 
variables that may provide a better idea as to some of the factors that influence this timing.   
 
The cyclicality of donor income is the main variable of focus; however, is this relationship robust 
through varying fiscal stances?  Perhaps the donor nation's budget surplus as a percentage of 
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GDP is also related to the ease with which disbursements of aid flow to recipient nations.  And 
what of recipient GDP, or even relative GDP between the donor and the recipient?  We have 
seen that LDCs tend to receive the most procyclical funding; is this relationship true of the 
disbursement gap as well?  And finally, is it reasonable to expect that the donor nation may make 
disbursement decisions in part based on the cyclicality of the recipient nation's income per 
capita?   
 
To answer these questions, the matrices of SumDiffGdry, SumDiffGdry, and SumDiffGdry are 
calculated, each normalized again by division of GDP in the year y of analysis, and regressed 
with the equations: 
drddrddry CycSumDiffG  
 
drddrddry CycSumDiffL  
 
drddrddry CycSumDiffT    
 
where Cycd is the vector over the 41-year period of the cyclical component of donor income per 
capita, and the omega matrix is a series of control variables such as the donor's budget surplus as 
a percentage of GDP, total donor GDP per capita, total recipient GDP per capita, the ratio of 
donor/recipient per capita GDP, the size of the aid flow, and the cyclicality of recipient GDP per 
capita.   
 
The analysis begins with OLS regressions without the omega vector; only the lone regressor of 
the donor's cyclical component of income was used.  The dataset includes 23 donors, 153 
recipients, and three aid flow types, which allows for just over 10,000 potential regressions to be 
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evaluated.  Many pairings have insufficient aid data, and many others are insignificant.  
Removing regressions that fail to be significant at the α = 0.10 level leaves only 899 regressions 
for total aid.  These 899 total aid regression results are summarized in Table 8.   
 
Table 8: Significant regression results, cumulative disbursement gaps  












+ - + - + - + - 
Austria 16 17 4 10 1 3 1 1 
Belgium 5 24 4 5 5 0 3 0 
Canada 7 7 1 1 3 5 0 0 
Denmark 4 12 0 2 3 6 1 0 
France 4 27 0 7 5 1 3 0 
Germany 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 1 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 5 85 1 30 4 3 2 0 
Luxembourg 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Netherlands 2 14 0 6 3 2 1 0 
Norway 4 6 2 2 0 14 0 2 
Portugal 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Spain 33 13 11 8 9 8 3 6 
Sweden 24 7 7 6 23 2 10 1 
Switzerland 40 31 13 11 3 0 1 0 
United Kingdom 6 24 1 8 7 7 1 2 
United States 1 6 0 4 1 3 0 2 
         
Australia 17 18 7 5 10 0 5 0 
Finland 2 19 0 5 0 8 0 3 
Japan 2 6 2 1 0 3 0 0 
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand 3 20 0 10 4 3 2 0 
         
TOTAL 176 340 54 123 82 71 34 19 
Note: From this stage, Korea must be omitted from most analyses, as it does not have a 
calculated OECD output gap. 
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Note that a majority of negative coefficients indicates that business cycle booms are related to an 
decrease in the donor's disbursement gap.  A summary across the DAC donor countries leaves 
initial evidence of countercyclical disbursement gaps with the OECD output gap, and procyclical 
disbursement gaps with the HP cyclicality measure, much as before.  We do not see any 
noticeable difference among the poorest countries.   
 
These results are without any control variables that may also have significant relation to the 
timing of disbursements.  Also, we may interpret procyclicality here as either relating to a 
reduced incidence of payment, or a higher incidence of commitment.  A conditional lag will be 
introduced later to address this question.   
 
For a closer initial investigation, the omega vector is now added to the matrix of regression 
results.  Fixed effects variables are used for each donor/recipient pairing.  Table 9 shows the 





In Table 9, we can see several consistencies in relation to the disbursement gap.  First, the 
incidence of undisbursed commitments in a given year is clearly procyclical for the donor.  Both 
the OECD output gap and the cyclical component of donor income are positively related to the 
disbursement gap.  This relationship is very highly significant in most specifications, while 
unemployment change is a weak indicator.   
 
Across all specifications, the control variables are much the same.  Greater donor income per 
capita is related to larger disbursement gaps.  However, it is quite possible that this relationship 
may be due to slower movements in the governments of wealthier nations.  The conditional lag, 
investigated next, will provide some clues as to whether this may be the case.  Donor budget 
surplus is negatively related to the disbursement gap.  Nations with budget surpluses appear 
more likely to pay their commitments immediately.  The reader may question whether this 
relationship is really just a fiscal stance in relation to the business cycle of the donor country.  
This is possible.  The correlation between this budget surplus ratio and the OECD output gap is 
0.40, and the correlation between budget surplus and the detrended cyclicality measure is 0.29.  
But given that these correlations are not extremely high, and that foreign aid disbursements and 
budgetary decisions are typically made by different factions of a government, this control 
variable is retained.   
 
Recipient GDP is significantly related to the disbursement gap in the full sample, with wealthier 
recipient nations receiving more timely disbursements.  There may be a nonlinearity in this 
relationship, as the wealthiest recipient countries show positive coefficients on this control 
variable, suggesting that the wealthiest nations in this group suffer from larger disbursement 
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gaps.  Interestingly, the business cycle of the recipient nation appears positively related to the 
disbursement gap in the full sample specifications.  Donors are more likely to pay less on their 
commitments when recipient income is above trend.  Again, the disbursement gap is a 
combination of both commitments and payments, the timing of which is hidden in this initial 
analysis.   
 
In Table 9b, we are able to see the same regressions for the more recent subset of 1991-2010.  
Within this 20-year time frame, we can see that the disbursement gap remains procyclical for 
both measures of cyclicality, although not so for LDCs.  Employment changes remains a poor 
predictor of the disbursement gap.  Wealthier donor nations still tend to have larger disbursement 
gaps, larger budget surpluses reduce the disbursement gap, and cumulative disbursement gaps 




If we abandon employment changes as a potential regressor in explaining the disbursement gap, 
we may choose to look at the relationship between the disbursement gap and the business cycle 
across each nation.  Table 10 provides the coefficients for both the OECD output gap and the HP 
cyclical component of income for each donor nation, with the same omega vector of control 
variables as used above.   
 
Table 10: The Cumulative Disbursement Gap as a Function of Cyclicality and Controls,  
1970 - 2010 
 Full Sample LDCs UMICs 















































   0.001 -1.085
***
 




























Norway -0.009 0.753 -0.019 0.035 -0.004 0.108 






























United Kingdom -0.007 0.354 -0.009 1.118 0.021
*
 0.201 
United States -0.004 -2.591
*
 -0.010 -3.794 -0.028 -3.392 












































 Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
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Using the OECD output gap as a regressor for the full sample, 9 of the 23 DAC donor nations 
show a coefficient significant at a minimum of the α = 0.05 level.  Of these, 4 are positive, 
providing no further evidence of procyclicality of the cumulative disbursement gap with this 
measure.  Using the HP filter, there are 13 significant regressors in this table, and 7 of these are 
positive.  Again, no procyclicality of the disbursement gap is evident here.  This is similar to the 
results in the LDC subset, where 4 of 7 significant regressors are positive for the output gap, and 
7 of 12 for the HP filter.  The general result from these baseline analyses is that there appears to 
be no evidence suggesting that the disbursement gap from year to year across donor nations 
tends to be procyclical or countercyclical with donor income, even though the cumulative 
disbursement gap has been shown to be significantly procyclical overall.   
 
In the most recent subsample, the results are similar.  There are 9 significant coefficients (again, 
at the α = 0.05 level) on the OECD output gap in the full subsample, and 7 of those are negative, 
indicating a potential shift toward countercyclicality of the disbursement gap in recent decades.  
Results for the HP filtered cyclicality measure are neutral, with 5 of 11 positive and significant 
coefficients.  A cursory glance at the results for low income countries over this time period 







Table 10b: The Cumulative Disbursement Gap as a Function of Cyclicality and Controls,  
1991 - 2010 
 Full Sample LDCs UMICs 







 -0.008 -1.044 
Belgium 0.009 1.962
*
 -0.011 -1.107 0.009 1.094 
Canada 0.004 0.791 -0.015 -0.779 -0.001 -0.429 





















Greece 0.000 -0.082   0.001 -0.299 





































Portugal 0.001 0.254 0.007 0.877 -0.002 -0.286 







































       

































 Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
 
2.3.5     Extensions 
So far, we have only seen the results of the disbursement gaps and cumulative as measured 
within a year.  Here, a conditionally lagged disbursement gap is introduced.  Second, there has 
been no analysis of whether the disbursement gap is related to particularly large cyclical 
fluctuations for either the donor or the recipient.  Third, there may be significance to be found in 
non-linear relationships between cyclicality and the disbursement gap.  To test this, higher-order 
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terms for the cyclical regressors may be explored.  Fourth, the best known target for DAC 
nations in bilateral foreign aid is a 0.7% of GNI target.  As this is measured by disbursements 
rather than commitments, this threshold may induce commitments to be more likely backed by 
cash.  In this section, these additional tests will be presented.   
 
We start with the addition of cubed cyclical variables and the introduction of two "large negative 
shock" dummy variables; one for donors, and another for recipients.  For donor nations, this 
variable is one if the OECD output gap of a donor nation is in the lowest 5% of the output gaps 
in the total sample, and zero otherwise.  For recipient nations, this variable is one if the semi-log 
transformed HP filtered cyclicality measure is in the lowest 10% of values across all recipient 
observations.  The percentile level of 5% was chosen arbitrarily, in order to capture the worst 
downturns of the donors.  The 10% level was chosen with a simple supposition that unfavorable 
shocks are perhaps twice as likely in recipient nations.  In the dataset, there is evidence that the 
poorest countries have a disproportionate share of large negative shocks.  The LDCs in the 




Adding these new variables to the original omega vector used previously allows for several 
specifications, which are displayed in Table 11.  Across the entire sample, procyclicality of the 
cumulative disbursement gap continues to be predominant, using either measure of cyclicality.  
The cubed cyclicality measures are not significant across the full sample, but especially large 
movements from trend appear to be especially disadvantageous to the poorest recipient nations.  
Large negative shocks to donor income tend to reduce the disbursement gap, as do large negative 
shocks to recipient income.  This is a welcome result, as we tend to think of foreign aid as being 
particularly relevant to circumstances of recipient downturns.  With these additional controls, it 
is clear that lower income donor countries and donor nations with higher budget surpluses 
continue to have smaller disbursement gaps.  Also, evidence is consistent that wealthier 
recipients collect more of their bilateral aid commitments.  Most of these regularities are also 
true for the subsample of LDCs.  Finally, the cyclicality of recipient income appears to be less 




The most recent subperiod shows largely the same results as in Table 11.  The cumulative 
disbursement gap remains generally procyclical, the gap is greater for wealthier donors, donor 
nations with budget deficits, and is greater for poorer recipients.  Large recipient shocks to 
income are paired with lower cumulative disbursement gaps, as before.   
 
Finally, a conditional lagged disbursement gap is calculated from the data.  Since some bilateral 
aid commitments can take years to be disbursed, it is not unreasonable to allow at least one year 








































This variable then allows one extra year for a commitment to be disbursed, addressing a portion 
of pure timing issues by eliminating simple one-year lags.
28
  Chronic underpayments of 






                                                 
28
 In comparing the original set of cumulative disbursement gaps with the conditional lag, 
approximately 22% of the 144,279 observations change with the conditional lag rule.   
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Table 12: The Conditionally Lagged Disbursement Gap  
as a Function of Cyclicality and Controls, 1970 - 2010 
DAC Nation Full Dataset LDCs UMICs 
OECD Output gap 0.010
***
  0.000  0.009
***
  






















































 0.183 0.158 -0.034 0.056 
       
n =  108,308 126,224 37,947 44,482 30,437 35,489 
Within R
2
 =  0.0403 0.0416 0.0353 0.0429 0.0383 0.0396 




Table 12b: The Conditionally Lagged Disbursement Gap  
as a Function of Cyclicality and Controls, 1991 - 2010 
DAC Nation Full Dataset LDCs UMICs 







Donor HP100  3.795
***
  -0.098  0.339 













































 0.164 0.148 -0.108 -0.076 
       
n =  62,832 65,688 21,274 22,241 17,578 18,377 
Within R
2
 =  0.0390 0.0335 0.0026 0.0039 0.0066 0.0067 
 Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
The question of slower disbursements related to larger bureaucracies in wealthier nations may be 
partially answered by a comparison between Tables 9 and 12.  The cyclicality measures as 
predictors of the conditionally lagged cumulative disbursement gap has nearly the same 
coefficient as for the original cumulative disbursement gap measure.  Only a small decline in the 
magnitude of these coefficients is seen, offering little empirical support that there are significant 
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timing differences in aid payment.  Most values across all specifications are very close to those 
in Table 8, indicating that short-term timing is not a primary issue in explanation of the 
disbursement gap overall.   
 
In Table 12b, we look at the same analyses for the 1991-2010 subperiod.  Comparing this to the 
cumulative disbursement gap analysis in Table 9b, we can again note a small decline in the 
magnitude of the effects of the cyclicality measures.   
 
Table 13: The Conditionally Lagged Disbursement Gap  
as a Function of Cyclicality and Controls, 1970 - 2010 
DAC Nation Full Sample LDCs UMICs 
























 -0.005 0.106 
France -0.029
*
 1.423 -0.045 5.233
**












   0.000 -0.944
***
 






























Norway -0.013 0.424 -0.024 -0.442 -0.003 -0.034 






















































































 Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
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Table 13 provides coefficients for regression of the conditionally lagged cumulative 
disbursement gap on both the OECD output gap and the HP cyclical component of income for 
each donor nation given the omega vector of control variables, as Table 10 provided for the 
cumulative disbursement gap.  The OECD output gap as a regressor for the full sample shows 19 
of the 23 DAC donor nations with a coefficient significant at a minimum of the α = 0.05 level.  
Of these, 11 are positive, showing a much higher preponderance of positive coefficients using 
the conditional lagged disbursement gap than with the cumulative disbursement gap.  Using the 
HP filter, there are 16 significant regressors in this table, and 11 of these are positive.  Again, this 
is greater evidence of procyclicality of bilateral aid disbursements when a single lagged year is 
taken into account.   The LCD countries also show greater procyclicality of aid disbursements 
than before, with 9 of 13 significant regressors are positive for the output gap, and 13 of 16 for 
the HP filter.  There remains greater evidence of procyclicality with this timing adjustment, 
although the poorest countries to not seem to suffer this effect disproportionately.   
 
In the subperiod of 1991-2010, the conditional lag adjustment does not show the procyclicality 
shift as it appeared in the full sample.  Only 2 of 10 significant regressions are positive when 
using the OECD output gap, and 4 of 11 for the HP cyclicality measure.  This method of analysis 
tends to provide mixed results of cyclicality of the cumulative disbursement gap, or perhaps a 





Table 13b: The Conditionally Lagged Disbursement Gap  
as a Function of Cyclicality and Controls, 1991 - 2010 
DAC Nation Full Sample LDCs UMICs 





 -0.019 -2.539 -0.005 -0.902 
Belgium 0.005 1.606 -0.021 -2.057 0.010 1.101 
Canada 0.009 1.278 -0.011 0.148 0.011 0.781 



















Greece 0.000 -0.067   -0.001 -0.245 











































Portugal 0.002 0.254 0.007 0.857 -0.001 -0.246 
Spain -0.021 -1.620 -0.035 -2.993
*



































       




 -0.008 2.146 


































In Table 14, we see the results of fixed effect regression of donor/recipient pairings across the 
entire sample, as was done for the cumulative disbursement gap in Table 11.  Using the 
conditional lagged cumulative disbursement gap, we see little difference.  Nearly all coefficients 
show the same sign, significance, and level.     
 
In the more recent subperiod of 1991-2010 there is little change, except for the stronger evidence 
of procyclicality of the cumulative disbursement gap.  Once the conditional year lag is included, 
we can see that the OECD output gap is also highly significantly procyclical across the full 




Finally, the ODA/GNI target of 0.7% is examined for its potential effect on donor behavior.  In 
1970, this target was largely agreed upon, after suggestion by the Pearson Commission in 1969 
and a U.N. resolution in October of 1970.  This goal has been reiterated many times since, and so 
it is reasonable to expect that donor nations would prefer to demonstrate compliance in bilateral 
foreign aid decisions.  This measure is reported as the net total disbursements divided by GNI for 
each year.  It is possible, then, that those nations around the 0.7% mark may demonstrate a 
tendency to "stretch" their disbursements beyond what they may otherwise choose, decreasing 
the disbursement gap when they are close to the threshold.  
 
To answer this question, the series of ODA/GNI measures were taken for each DAC donor 
nation from stats.oecd.org, to be introduced in each of the  econometric specifications of Table 
14.  On average, donor countries continually fail to reach this goal, as the average of this ratio 
over all observations is 0.41%.  The standard deviation of these observations is 0.26%, with a 
minimum of 0.02% (mostly by Korea and Portugal) and a maximum of 1.17% (largely Norway).   
 
If it is true that those near the 0.7% mark tend to stretch their disbursements, then we may begin 
by choosing a simple dummy variable to denote those observations where this ratio is near the 
mark, such as 5 basis points in either direction.  Such a variable was created for those 
observations where the ODA/GNI ratio was between 0.65% and 0.75%.  There are 2,754 
observations within this band, over 20,000 above the band, and over 100,000 below.  This 
"threshold dummy" variable is shown in Table 15.  One potential criticism of using this measure 
is that, since the chosen range surrounding 0.7% is near the upper end of the overall range of the 
ODA/GNI measure, perhaps there is a simple relationship between the ODA/GNI ratio and the 
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disbursement gap that is being connected with the dummy variable.  To control for this, the 
ODA/GNI ratio is included in some specifications.   
 
Another way of using this information to test for disbursement behavior near this threshold is to 
not use an arbitrary cutoff for a dummy variable, but simply measure the dispersion of ODA/GNI 
around the threshold.  For this, a continuous variable, the "squared threshold gap," is also 











.  If donor nations do tend to disburse more to reach the 
much celebrated threshold of 0.7% of GNI, then we should expect to see the threshold dummy to 
have a negative impact on the disbursement gap, and we should also expect to see the squared 




Table 15 shows the results of these new specifications.  It is clear from the coefficients on the 
ODA/GNI ratio that the disbursement gap is correlated with smaller levels of ODA as a fraction 
of income.  This in itself is an interesting relationship, considering that larger levels of ODA 
should logically allow for a larger potential gap between commitments and disbursements.  We 
can see that this is not the case.  The threshold dummy shows us that, given the use of the OECD 
output gap as our cyclicality measure, those donor nations close to disbursing 0.7% of GNI in 
foreign aid do contract their disbursement gap significantly more than those far from this range.  
Similar evidence is demonstrated in the coefficients of the squared threshold gap, where nations 
giving at greater distances from the 0.7% threshold are significantly more likely to increase, or 
fail to decrease, their foreign aid disbursement gap.  Clearly this goal, emphasized in the arena of 
bilateral aid for more than 40 years, appears to serve as an incentive for more timely ODA 





Finally, Table 15b is provided for the subperiod of 1991-2010, with the same results as shown in 
Table 15 for the full 41-year sample.  As before, greater evidence of procyclicality is 
demonstrated here relative to the OECD output gap.  Again, those donor nations giving a greater 
percentage of their GNI to recipients have lower disbursement gaps, and the 0.7% bilateral 
foreign aid target continues to appear significant in motivating payment of aid commitments.   
 
2.4     Conclusion 
Aid flows continue to appear to be procyclical in nature, although the strength of this relationship 
changes with the specific measure chosen.  This paper summarizes the disbursement gap and 
cumulative disbursement gap, searching for connections between payments of signed bilateral 
aid obligations and the business cycle of the donor nation.  Multiple tests and specifications 
revealed that the disbursement gap was significantly positively related to both standard measures 
of the business cycle, both with and without control variables, and with each extension explored.  
This relationship appears robust across all donor nations as a set, although counts of individual 
donor/recipient pairings do not show the same procyclicality in all specifications.   
 
As research develops surrounding bilateral aid, disbursements, and motivations, evidence 
continues to develop that efforts appear to be procyclical in nature, and connected in many ways 
more to the donor nation than the recipient nation.  The benevolent motivation is hard to justify, 
both theoretically and empirically.  The present work adds to this growing literature in showing 
that, even in the face of a signed commitment of bilateral foreign aid, nations still tend to make 
payment decisions based more on their own business cycle and fiscal stance than the apparent 
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needs of recipient nations.  Also, the 0.7% of GNI target disbursement ratio appears to affect aid 
payments to a much larger degree than the need of recipients.   
 
The reasons to why this empirical regularity exists are likely to be found at pairing-level 
analyses.  The function describing the cumulative disbursement gap is likely much more 
complex than this initial attempt, and may well include the spectrum of conservativism of the 
governing parties in donor nations, measures of bureaucratic complexity, key dates regarding the 
millennium development goals, etc.  This body of knowledge is within the purview of future 
research.   
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Chapter 3 




Using both the round six and 2006-2008 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) data for 
both male and female respondents along with macroeconomic data over the same time period, I 
test a number of theoretical questions regarding changes in relationship exit costs and their 
effects on behavior in cohabitation, marriage, and separation.  I find that our proxy for 
cohabitation surplus and exit costs significantly affects subsequent decisions of cohabitation, 
marriage, separation, and divorce.  Also, marriage hazard rates are related to these changing exit 




3.1     Introduction 
Couples dating in high-income countries are increasingly likely to cohabitate prior to marriage.  
Traditional mores are quickly giving way to pragmatic, economical living arrangements that 
espouse a "try before you buy" attitude regarding marriage.  The number of unmarried cohabiting 
couples is at record levels; but what is even more significant, perhaps, is the rate of acceleration 
in this trend.  In fact, while the census bureau estimated 12 million unmarried cohabitors in the 
U.S. in its 2005-2007 survey, that number exceeded 13 million in 2009, and reached 15 million 
in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  Even these numbers may be understated.  It is widely cited 
that between 1960 and 2000, unmarried cohabitation grew tenfold (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).  
However, adjustments to survey data performed by Fitch, Goeken, and Ruggles (2005) suggest 
that the reported cohabitation rates prior to 1980 are likely overstated, suggesting that this 
increase in cohabitation between 1960 and 2000 may more accurately be a 28-fold increase.  
Stevenson & Wolfers (2007) provide an excellent summary of the considerable changes in 
dynamics of the household in recent years, leading to fewer marriages and divorces, and the 
driving forces behind this pervasive acceleration in incidence of cohabitation.   
 
Arguably, cost sharing is part of the reason for this recent surge, and is indeed one focus of this 
paper.  Theory reasonably suggests that couples are more likely to marry when there are 
significant cost savings to do so, and the economic downturn that began in 2006 and has 
persisted in recent years has presented couples with attractive incentives to join this trend.  
However, this short-run cyclical effect is simultaneous with the long-term trend toward increased 
cohabitation which has been noted for decades.  With the better information regarding their 
potential mate generated by cohabitation, one might expect that marriages formed after 
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premarital cohabitation are more successful than those without.  But empirical studies reveal a 
persistent "marriage hazard puzzle," as marriages preceded by cohabitation seem subject to 
higher divorce rates.  Much literature has explored this marriage hazard puzzle (for example, see 
Bennett et al., 1988; Axinn & Thornton, 1992; Hall & Zhao, 1995; Brown & Booth, 1996; 
Bramlett & Mosher, 2002; and Brien, Lillard, & Stern, 2006).  More recent evidence indicates 
that, given the right set of control variables, there is empirical support for premarital cohabitation 
as a "marriage trial," and that it may actually reduce rates of subsequent divorce (Kulu & Boyle, 
2010).  Other research focuses on the change in this relationship over time, concluding most 
generally that this negative effect of premarital cohabitation on marital success appears to have 
weakened in recent decades (Kamp Dush et al., 2003; Hewitt & De Vaus, 2009; Reinhold, 2010).  
In summary, the "marriage hazard puzzle" remains an active area of research.   
 
The focus of this paper is not the "trial" motivation for premarital cohabitation, but rather shared 
living costs, cohabitation surplus, and other economic influences in relation to cohabitation, 
marriage, and separation decisions.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In 
section 2 recent advancements in theory are explored regarding cohabitation, marriage, and 
divorce, empirical work that has been done in concert with that theory, and additional testable 
research questions that have been chosen from recent advances in theoretical literature.  Section 
3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis.  In section 4 this dataset is used to test the 
theoretical predictions regarding exit costs and relationship decisions that have been introduced.  
Section 5 concludes, and discusses limitations to empirical tests that may be addressed by more 
complete data in the future.   
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3.2     Relevant Literature and Empirical Questions  
The works of Becker may perhaps be considered the starting point for the mainstream branch of 
economic theory that includes cohabitation and marriage as a subset.  Gains from marriage can 
be shown by considering the production of household and market goods.  Within this dichotomy, 
it is posited that, in a partnership, household goods can be produced more efficiently, and 
cooperation may allow the substitutability of time away from household goods and toward 
market goods (Becker, 1974).  Other explanations of marriage are acknowledged, including love, 
desire for children, etc. which are also valid.  However, the focus of this paper will remain on 
quantifiable, financial gains and from cohabitation and marriage over and above that of a single-
person household.   
 
If we consider the substitutability of time in the production of the necessary household good and 
the consumable market good, then, ceteris paribus, a rise in market wages can be shown to 
increase the utility of market work, making a cohabitation or marriage arrangement of greater 
value (Becker, 1974).  It has been shown empirically that, when controlling for years of 
schooling, higher-wage individuals tend to marry earlier (Keeley, 1979).  There is also evidence 
from longitudinal studies that delayed marriage allows career development and wage 
enhancement, although later marriages are often formed with partners of lower income levels 
(Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2004).  However, the macroeconomic climate is also been shown to 
have an inverse relationship to marriage formation.  Inflation is positively related to marriage 
formation in recent theory, and this is supported empirically (Burdett et. al, 2011).  Also, 
differential tax treatment also affects cohabitation and marriage decisions; specifically, while the 
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decision to marry seems to be only minimally related to tax code, the decision to progress from 
cohabitation to marriage is significantly related (Alm & Whittington, 2003).  
 
It is widely reported in popular press that recessions are associated with increases in 
cohabitation.  A 2010 Census Bureau report acknowledges that cohabitation increased 13% 
between 2009 and 2010, a much faster rate of increase than is the long-run trend, and during 
what some term the "great recession" (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  Additionally, it has been 
shown in a European study that co-residential decisions are statistically related to perceived job 
insecurity (Becker et. al, 2010) and with poor performance of the labor market (Card & Lemieux, 
2000).  This is a logical behavioral choice, given the significant economic advantages presented 
to cohabitors (Lundberg & Pollak, 2007; Bütikofer & Gerfin, 2009).  Given these findings, 
perhaps the most basic question to ask is: Do we find evidence that changes in the returns to 
shared living expenses (proxied by varied economic environments) increase the likelihood of 
cohabitation?  If cohabitation is driven, at least partially, by the cost-sharing living arrangement 
that accompanies it, then there should be clear empirical data to substantiate this.  Many informal 
studies present data that worsening economic environments usher in larger numbers of 
cohabitating couples, and this is a logical expectation.  In this paper, data are explored to 
examine this question in the context of recent theoretical advances.   
 
Once a couple cohabits, there is generally a point in time where the couple decides to escalate to 
marriage, or to separate.  There is some evidence that this "deadline" effect exists.  Summary 
statistics provided of the 1987-1988 National Survey of Families and Households dataset 
indicate that may be approximately two years; less than 40% of cohabitations last that long 
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without proceeding to marriage or ending in separation, and the median cohabitation length at 
that time was just 1.3 years (Bumpass & Sweet, 1989).  However, other evidence suggests that 
the mean lengths of cohabitation have risen from about 2.5 years in the 1980s to 3.5 years around 
the year 2000 (United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study).  Further, Kennedy & Bumpass 
(2008) use the 1995 and 2002 rounds of the NSFG to determine that average cohabitation length 
has increased since the early 1990s, when two-thirds of cohabitations ended within two years, 
either in marriage or separation.  Their more recent data suggests that only 56% of cohabitations 
end within two years, as more couples experience longer cohabitation periods.  Still, only one in 
ten cohabitations persists after ten years, according to the General Household Survey 1979–2007.   
 
If and when the decision to marry or separate approaches, we should expect exit costs, expense 
sharing, etc. to affect this decision.  A second empirical question is then: Does a "deadline effect" 
exist, and if so, what exogenous factors affect both the deadline effect, and the decision to marry 
or separate?  Data are utilized to attempt to answer this question as well.   
 
The hazard rate, or divorce rate of couples, is often studied as to contributing factors, including 
supposed effects of premarital cohabitation (for example, Axinn & Thornton, 1992; Lillard, 
Brien, & Waite, 1995; Kulu & Boyle, 2010).  Changes in unemployment levels have specifically 
been studied in various contexts, with empirical evidence suggesting that higher unemployment 
translates into a job loss within a home, providing a reason for divorce (Jensen and Smith, 1990; 
Boheim and Ermisch, 2001; Kraft, 2001; Eliason, 2004).  Theoretical justification for this most 
commonly involves a simple comparison between expected utility of marriage continuance and 
divorce, given a shock to the earnings of one spouse.  Charles and Stephens (2004), for example, 
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develop a simple model of marriage where dissolution is assumed to occur whenever the value of 
marriage (i.e. surplus above that of being single) drops to a negative value, which occurs with a 
job loss.  Given this empirical regularity, we expect to see the same in the current dataset.  
However, our focus is conditional upon the macroeconomic conditions in which the marriage 
was formed.  Specifically, a third question is posed: Are marriages formed during poor economic 
climates subject to higher hazard rates?  That is, if a couple marries in due in part to changes in 
monetary incentives, is their marriage more likely to end in divorce?  We may expect to see 
lower quality matches proceed to marriage in times of economic distress (Farmer & Horowitz 
2012), and if this lower expected marriage quality leads to greater divorce rates, we might also 
expect to see this third research question answered affirmatively by data, when controlling for 
the effects of higher unemployment rates at the time of divorce or separation.   
 
One final test of the importance of exit costs is their effect on decisions to end cohabitation when 
a relationship has reached the stage of separation.  This end is signaled clearly by divorce for 
married couples, even though the cohabitation may be delayed due to economic conditions, 
much as the start of cohabitation may similarly affected.  This is a growing trend often reported 
in popular press
29
, but is still a relatively underdeveloped area of study.  Many reasons for 
choosing to continue cohabitation after divorce as reported in informal sources are similar to 
those given for other cohabitation arrangements: cost savings.  Expense sharing appears to be a 
powerful motivator in causal anecdotal evidence, and so a fourth question is formulated for 
further investigation: When divorce is imminent, does cohabitation last significantly longer when 
                                                 
29
 There were 37,000 results in a 4/21/12 Google search with the quoted terms "living together 
after divorce," and just four results on Google scholar, none dealing with the specific issue of 
post-divorce cohabitation by couples.   
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exit costs are higher?  While much as been written on divorce, most of the literature does not 
distinguish between separation of living quarters and divorce.  But if exit costs are higher, we 
may expect to see the date of physical separation delayed relative to the date of divorce.  
Fortunately, the richness of the chosen cohabitation dataset allows us to test this directly.   
 
3.3     Data  
To empirically test the effect of exit costs on cohabitation patterns, multiple datasets were used.  
The cohabitation data is from the 2002 (Cycle 6) and 2006-2008 National Survey of Family 
Growth (NSFG) surveys, which were designed and administered by the National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS), in collaboration with other Federal agencies.  These were the 6th and 
7th such surveys conducted by the NHCS in the past 30 years, and were the first two to have 
both male and female datasets.  The 2002 survey was conducted from January 2002 to March 
2003, and the 2006-2008 survey was conducted from June of 2006 to December of 2008.   
 
Face to face interviews were used to collect data from 14,960 women and 11,063 men all 
between the ages of 15 and 45 years of age in the combined two rounds of the survey.  The 
trained interviewers were all women, who used laptop computers to conduct the interviews.  The 
interviews lasted an average of about one hour.  The date of the interview was captured as a 
variable and included in the database.  Thousands of variables were captured, including detailed 
data regarding pregnancy, sexual activity, childbearing, healthcare, cohabitation, marriage, 
divorce, adopted children, and attitudes about these things.  Respondents were paid $40 for their 
time, and sampling weights were provided to address, among other things, the oversampling of 
blacks, Hispanics, and respondents of age 15-24.   
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To protect the anonymity of the respondents, personal identifying variables are not in the dataset.  
The excluded variables include even the state of residence.  Therefore, interstate variation is 
impossible to study in the NSFG dataset.  However, the richness of the dataset in terms of the 
cohabitation, marriage, and divorce variables, which include month and year of each event, make 
the NSFG seemingly the best choice for empirical analysis of cohabitation behavior.   
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 n Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Age at interview 
Age at the start of 1
st
 cohabitation 





 cohabitation in months (of those ended) 
Length of 1
st
 premarital cohabitation in months (nonzero) 
Length of 1
st
 marriage in months (of those ended) 
Lived in an intact family until the age of 18 
Mother has a four-year college degree 
Father has a four-year college degree 
Respondent was born into Catholic religion 
Respondent was born into Baptist religion 
Respondent was born into other Protestant religion 
Respondent attended church at least monthly at age 14 












































Table 1 presents a set of descriptive statistics of the variables chosen for analysis.  The average 
age of the respondents surveyed in this combined dataset was 29.17 years at the time of the 
interview.  Of the 26,021 respondents, 10,034 reported having been married at least once, at an 
average age of 23.7 years at the time of their first marriage.  Of this subset, 2,614 had divorced 
by the time of the interview.  Varied information was gathered about each respondent's 
childhood and family background.  When asked if he/she lived in an intact family until the age of 
18, 60.6% of respondents surveyed claimed that they had.  The educational level of attainment 
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by both parents was also recorded, and possession of a four-year college degree was chosen as 
the cutoff for an educational attainment binary variable for each parent.  19.2% of respondents' 
mothers and 22.5% of respondents' fathers have at least a four-year college degree.   
 
Each respondent reported the religion in which they were raised.  The broad categories include 
Catholic, Baptist, or other Protestant, and 82.8% of the sample reported one of these as 
representative of their childhood religious affiliation.  Nearly 28% claimed to have attended 
church either once per month, one to three times per month, or every week at the age of fourteen.  
Finally, respondents were asked how important religion is in their daily life.  Among the choices 
of "very important", "somewhat important", and "not important", 43.4% said that their religion is 
very important to them.   
 
In exploration of the choices people make in cohabitation, marriage, and divorce, the NSFG 
dataset is fairly rich.  Each respondent is asked a series of questions about the century month (the 
month and year converted to a standard four digit code) in which their first former cohabitation 
began, and the century month in which it ended, if so.  The respondent provided the same 
information for subsequent cohabitations, and also for the starting month of their first marriage, 
second marriage, etc.  Also, the starting month of their current cohabitation, if applicable, was 
collected.  From the resulting series of variables, it is possible to ascertain the first cohabitation 
by starting date, whether it was premarital or upon marriage.  This first cohabital relationship 
then either proceeded to marriage, ended in separation, or was in continuation at the time of the 
interview.  All of this information was captured and formatted in a linear fashion for analysis of 




cohabitation of respondent i are defined as jiStart  and 
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iEU were also recorded as of these dates, and then the 




i EUSUUchange  was calculated.   
The average length of first marriages ending by the interview was 6.4 years, whereas the 
remaining 7,420 first marriages reported to be in progress had an average age at the time of the 
interview of 9.3 years.  The average length of first cohabitations ending by the interview was 3.9 
years.  Cohabitations include marital cohabitation, whether or not the start of cohabitation began 
before marriage.  The range of these lengths is significant; some cohabitations/marriages ended 
in the same month in which they began.  The oldest cohabitations/marriages in the current 
dataset began in the early 1970s.  Half of the more than 16,000 cohabitations in the dataset (2nd 
and 3rd quartile by time) began between March of 1989 and February of 2000.   
 
The NSFG dataset contained responses about home ownership, children, and other variables that 
could potentially be used to measure exit costs.  However, these measures are endogenously 
determined, and so cannot be used to measure the effect of an exit cost change.  Other measures 
of exit costs from outside of this dataset that can be argued as relevant include some relative 
earning potential change, as well as any external measure of "re-matching" cost.   
 
The first of these, potential change in earnings/employment prospects, may be proxied by 
general economic conditions, measured by macroeconomic indicators such as the national 
unemployment level.  To include this measure, U.S. nationwide unemployment measures for 
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each month were obtained from The Bureau of Labor Statistics
30
.  These numbers were matched 
with each observation date in the NSFG dataset to create several new variables of the 
unemployment rate at each respondent's date of start of cohabitation, end of cohabitation, start of 
marriage, separation, and divorce.  Over the range of dates reported in this dataset, the U.S. 
unemployment rate ranged from 3.8% to 10.8%.  
 
3.4     Exploration of Research Questions 
In section 2, four research questions were posed.  In this section, these questions are explored 
with the current dataset, evaluating any supporting empirical evidence.  As mentioned in the 
introduction, the marriage hazard puzzle appears to be a robust empirical regularity in a number 
of prior analyses.  We may first search the current dataset for support of the marriage hazard 
puzzle.  A simple descriptive table is provided to show survival rates of marriages within the 
groups of respondents who married with and without premarital cohabitation. 
 
Table 2: Marriage Survival Rates 
 n 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Couples premaritally cohabited 





















This sampling is truncated, using only those who married for the first time at least 5 years prior 
to the interview, so that comparable measures of success could be ascertained.  With no control 
variables, there appears to be no discernible difference between the groups.  At five years, there 
is only minimal evidence of the marriage hazard puzzle, as a slightly larger percentage of  
                                                 
30
 Data were obtained from www.bls.gov; Series ID: LNS14000000.   
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premarital cohabitors have divorced.  To analyze the data further, I allow marital success five 
years after the wedding to be a binary dependent variable, and offer three regression 
specifications in Table 3.   











Month of marriage/100 
Age at start of cohabitation 
Income level (by categorized variable) 
Intact family until the age of 18 
Mother has four-year college degree 
Father has four-year college degree 
Born into Catholic religion 
Born into Baptist religion 
Born into other Protestant religion 
Attended church at least monthly at 14 



























































Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
In Table 3, we can continue to see the weakness of premarital cohabitation as a predictor of 
marital success after 5 years.  Both by itself and with control variables, this indicator fails to be 
significant.  In the second specification, it appears to reduce success when only time is controlled 
for; but again, this result is very fragile.  While the coefficient is negative on premarital 
cohabitation in all three specifications, the indicator is very weak.  This is less surprising, given 
that, as mentioned above, other authors have noted that the marriage hazard puzzle seems to have 
weakened over time.
31
  In fact, to explore the question of whether there is evidence of a 
weakening of the marriage hazard puzzle over time in the current data, Tables 2a and 3a are 
                                                 
31
 Reinhold (2010) uses rounds 4, 5, and 6 for his analysis, and already sees a weakening in this 
relationship.  Given that only rounds 6 and 7 are used here, a weak relationship is to be expected.   
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presented, where the dataset is divided into two groups: those cohabitations and marriages 
beginning before 1994, and those beginning in 1994 and later.
32
   
 
Table 2a: Marriage Survival Rates, Separated Sample 
 n 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Prior to 1994: 
Couples premaritally cohabited 
Couples cohabiting at marriage 
Difference 
 
1994 to 2003: 
Couples premaritally cohabited 
























































The marriage hazard puzzle again is indicated by negative differences in the survival rates, in 
time periods shown in Table 2a.  Note that these negative differences are seen in the early data at 
two years and beyond, and in the later data at four years and beyond.  Interestingly, this 
"cohabitation hazard premium" has indeed decreased in comparisons with cutoff lengths between 
two and four years, consistent with other empirical works.  It appears that, cohabitation is 
connected with larger hazard rates only for those marriages that survive beyond a certain 
threshold, indicated in the NSFG data as approximately four years.  This is especially evident in 
the subset of more recent marriages.   
 
Premarital cohabitation does appear to be a stabilizing factor for marriages in the first year.  The 
trial marriage theory is supported by the current evidence in the very short term.  It appears that, 
as marriages are evaluated at longer lengths, premarital cohabitation becomes decidedly 
                                                 
32
 1994 was chosen based on the data; this boundary allowed the observations to be split into two 
roughly equal groups.   
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destabilizing.  Does this trend continue?  To look at a 10-year comparison, we must ignore the 
most recent marriages, but the combined dataset still provides about 5,000 marriages, about 
2,000 of which were formed after premarital cohabitation.  Of those, 67% survived to a ten-year 
anniversary.  Of the roughly 3,000 marriages without premarital cohabitation, 72.8% continued 
after ten years.  It seems clear that the marriage hazard puzzle is still observed, but is much more 
clearly observed at longer periods of comparison.   
 
Table 3a: Probit Regression of Success of Marriage after Five Years, separated sample 
 
Before 1994 
  Mean     St. Err. 
 1994 to 2003 
  Mean       St. Err. 
Cohabited premaritally 
Month of marriage/100 
Age at start of cohabitation 
Income level (by categorized variable) 
Intact family until the age of 18 
Mother has four-year college degree 
Father has four-year college degree 
Born into Catholic religion 
Born into Baptist religion 
Born into other Protestant religion 
Attended church at least monthly at 14 

















































































Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
In Table 3a, a similar separation of the sample for unions formed before and after the first day of 
1994 is shown in a repeated probit regression.  In both sample subsets, premarital cohabitation 
remains a weakly negative influence on marital success.  While the marriage hazard puzzle is 
minimally indicated in this specification, its intertemporal change is not.  However, given the 
evidence above on longer-term comparisons, perhaps it would be interesting to see a similar 
probit regression as in Table 3 for marriage survival at 10 years instead of five years.  With a 5.8 
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percentage point disparity in survival rates, statistical significance is likely to be found at this 
length.   
 
In Table 3b, the marriage hazard puzzle has been identified as statistically evident at a ten-year 
comparison.  All three specifications show premarital cohabitation to be very highly statistically 
significant in predicting marriage hazard after a decade.  It is clear now that, at least at some 
level, the marriage hazard puzzle persists.   







Mean St. Err. 
Cohabited premaritally 
Month of marriage/100 
Age at start of cohabitation 
Income level (by categorized variable) 
Intact family until the age of 18 
Mother has four-year college degree 
Father has four-year college degree 
Born into Catholic religion 
Born into Baptist religion 
Born into other Protestant religion 





























































Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
It is noteworthy that, although this is the most recent data available from the NSFG studies, the 
marriages constituting the data in Table 3b are not as recent as the reader may assume.  The data 
was gathered from interviews from 2002 to 2008, and these marriages are all at least 10 years of 
age.  This means that even the most recent marriage represented in the table began as early as 
1998.  In fact, the range of starting months for the marriages represented in Table 3b spans over 
26 years, from July of 1972 to December of 1998.  The mean starting month is September of 
1988.   
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Future studies will be able to inform us of changes to the marriage hazard puzzle, and if the 
effects of cohabitation continue to weaken in predicting divorce.  Again, the main focus of this 
paper is on exit costs and their effects.  We may now begin addressing the first of four theoretical 
questions of cohabitation patterns.   
 
Question #1: Do we find evidence that changes in the returns to shared living expenses (proxied 
by varied economic environments) increase the likelihood of cohabitation?  
Shared living expenses are a significant financial benefit for couples, and much theory on 
cohabitation assumes that this may be a driver in couples choosing to cohabitate, or at least affect 
the timing of cohabitation.  Using the current datasets, simple regressions may be run, 
considering the unemployment level an exogenous proxy for cohabitation surplus, as greater 
unemployment levels are correlated with lower household income, and greater uncertainty 
regarding income flows.  As such, I start with a simple probit regression equation: 
(1)       1Cohab  
 
Cohab, or the incidence of premarital cohabitation as a binary variable, provides us some initial 
insight as to what factors affect cohabitation.  It is expected that higher levels of unemployment 
encourage cohabitation, as this is regularly observed.  The omega vector of respondent 
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Attended church at least monthly at 14 






















































Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of respondents conditional on their reaching the age of 25.  Recall that 
the dataset includes men and women from ages 15 to 45.  It is unreasonable to expect that lack of 
cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex among the very young respondents is due to a 
conscious decision to abstain; therefore, this truncation was made.  Within this truncated group, 
we can see that fewer male respondents in the dataset reported having cohabited, and those in 
lower income brackets do indeed cohabitate with greater frequency.   
 
Children are considered to be exogenously assigned into a family's religious affiliation.  At birth, 
a child does not choose whether or not they attend services of a particular affiliation, and the 
religious environment chosen for the child may affect choices made later in life.  The NSFG 
dataset includes a qualitative variable for church attendance at age 14, and this is also considered 
to be exogenously assigned, as behavior at that age is still typically dominated by the choices of 
the guardian.  The "traditional values" variables of living in an intact family, church attendance 
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in youth, and importance of religion all appear to reduce the instance of cohabitation, as does a 
higher education level of the respondent's father.   
 
The timing of cohabitation, especially when it does not coincide immediately with marriage, is 
quite likely to be influenced by macroeconomic conditions.  One indicator of economic forces 
encouraging or discouraging cohabitation is to examine only premarital cohabitations, and look 
for an effect of both the national unemployment level, and its 6-month change prior to the start of 
the cohabitation.  If these proxies for unanticipated changes in cohabitation opportunity cost do 
affect behavior, we might expect to see that this 6-month change is, on average, positive.  In fact, 
this is not observed in the data; the average 6-month change in unemployment prior to the start 
of cohabitation for the 10,557 premarital cohabitors is -0.034, providing no initial evidence of 
this relationship.  The average 6-month unemployment change prior to all cohabitations in the 
dataset was -0.041.   
 
One way we might consider answering this question of the effect of economic conditions on the 
timing of cohabitation is to look at the age at which the first cohabitation began.  If economic 
conditions were not drivers to cohabitate, then indicators should be insignificant in predicting the 
age at which a respondent first chose to cohabitate.   
 
Table 5 provides some evidence that this proxy for economic health does, in fact, tend to reduce 
the age of first-time cohabitors.  Higher levels of unemployment are associated with respondents 
entering into their first cohabitation (be it premarital or marital) at a younger age.  A six-month 
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change of unemployment for the worse also causes couples to move in at a younger age.  This is 
shown both with and without the usual panel of control variables.   
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Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
The question of likelihood of cohabitation in relation to economic conditions is therefore 
unsupported here.  The evidence does not clearly show that economic conditions closely predict 
the timing of cohabitation, but it does show that poor economic conditions encourage younger 
cohabitors to begin living together.  Shown to exist with and without control variables for 
income and other characteristics, clearly exit costs are related to cohabitation decisions.   
 
Question #2: Does a "deadline effect" exist, and if so, what exogenous factors affect both the 
deadline effect, and the decision to marry or separate?   
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Exploring this question requires us to also examine the length of time of cohabitation for further 
evidence of the importance of cohabitation surplus and exit costs.  A few initial questions might 
point us toward a possible conclusion.  First, is the length of the cohabitation period prior to 
marriage affected by the economic climate the couple faces?  That is, treating the length of 
cohabitation as an endogenous decision that is affected by macroeconomic conditions and other 
control variables, what do we find?  Do worsening macroeconomic conditions (correlating with 
greater cohabitation surplus and greater exit costs) lead to shorter cohabitation periods, and is 
there a differential effect between those cohabitors who ultimately marry, and those who 
ultimately separate?   
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Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
Table 6 provides some clear, initial evidence of this relationship.  The mean length of premarital 
cohabitation in this sample is 26 months, with a median length of 17 months.  In each 
specification, an increase in the aggregate unemployment rate is very highly significantly 
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associated with a shorter duration of premarital cohabitation.  That is, it appears that decaying 
economic conditions do coincide with faster decisions to marry, lending credibility to 
cohabitation surplus as a driver to both cohabitate, and to escalate to marriage.  Also, higher 
unemployment levels during the month of marriage also coincide with a decrease the length of 
the cohabitation.     
 
And what of relationships ending in separation?  If couples were driven to enter into and remain 
in cohabiting households by worsening economic conditions, the decision to separate should be 
delayed by higher rates of unemployment.   
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Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
Table 7 shows the effects of these variables on cohabitation length when the cohabitation 
ultimately ends in separation.  The 4,576 respondents in the sample whose first cohabitation 
experience ended in separation lived with their significant other for an average of 29 months.  I 
fail to find evidence here that a change in economic conditions keeps cohabitors together longer 
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when they are bound to separate.  Conversely, a worsening economic climate is shown here to 
decrease the length of nonmarital cohabitation as in the case of those who eventually married.  
While this is inconsistent with exit costs as drivers of cohabitation, it is consistent with theory 
discussed in the introduction, suggesting that a shock of unemployment within a household 
causes divorce, as the utility of marriage has fallen dramatically for one of the agents.  Perhaps 
this effect is also seen in premarital cohabitations, and is the dominating effect in this data.    
 
A more direct way of exploring this question is to look at the decision point itself.  One assertion 
by Farmer & Horowitz (2012) is that an exogenous increase in exit costs will, all else equal, 
cause cohabitors to be more likely to marry, accepting (on average) a lower quality draw, which 
will therefore increase marriage hazard in the long run.  With the current dataset and a proxy 
variable for exit costs, we can come very close to directly testing this theory.  Given an economic 
environment at the time of first cohabitation, I again take the change in unemployment to proxy 
for an exogenous shock to exit costs, and see if evidence suggests that increase in marriage 
incidence tends to follow worsening economic conditions, and whether those marriages are more 
likely to fail.   
 
A probit regression for only those respondents entering into a first cohabitation that has either 
evolved to marriage or ended in separation will allow each of these decisions to be evaluated 
simultaneously with the same list of control variables.  If worsening economic conditions, 
manifesting as potentially greater cost savings for cohabitors and greater costs for those who 
split, are legitimate factors affecting these decisions, we should expect such an analysis to show 
itself clearly in this model.   
 132 
Table 8: Probit Regression of Variables Affecting  




Mean St. Err. 
Unemployment at the time of decision 
Unemployment change during cohab. 
Age at the time of decision 
Intact family until the age of 18 
Mother has four-year college degree 
Father has four-year college degree 
Born into Catholic religion 
Born into Baptist religion 
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Attended church at least monthly at 14 





















































































Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
Table 8 shows the results of a probit model with the dependent variable as one if the respondent 
proceeded to marriage.  It is clear that both a higher level unemployment and a positive change 
in unemployment are instrumental in affecting the decisions of couples to marry.  Higher exit 
costs and greater cohabitation surplus are empirically consistent with theory.  Another 
component of exit costs is the opportunity cost of other potential relationships; that is, there is a 
higher opportunity cost to marriage when the potential pool of other mates is large.  This 
potential pool declines with age, and so this opportunity cost to marriage falls.  This is reflected 
in the positive and significant coefficient on age at the time of decision, where clearly older 
respondents were more likely to accept the relationship that they had, rather than to risk another 
relationship quality draw.  While controlling for age, we still see that higher exit costs 
significantly affect the decision to marry.   
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Question #3: Are marriages formed during poor economic climates subject to higher hazard 
rates?   
 
There are certain limitations to using the current dataset to answer this question.  The oldest 
respondent is only 45 years of age, and the average length of first marriages that end in divorce is 
somewhere from about 8 years (http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/ p70-97.pdf) to about 11 
years (http://www.divorceinfo.com/statistics.htm).  It can be problematic to rely on the length of 
marriage as an indicator of success, but we can at least compare the CDFs of divorces in the 
datasets for marriages borne out of various economic environments.   
 
In the current dataset of over 26,000 respondents, 10,034 have married, and 2,614 have already 
seen that first marriage end.  Those 10,034 marriages began on average 10.86 years prior to the 
interview.  The remaining 7,420 respondents who had remained married to their first spouse had, 
at the time of the interview, been married an average of 9.27 years.   
 
A total of 7,588 marriages occurred at least 5 years prior to the time of the interview, 5,266 
marriages occurred at least 10 years prior to the time of the interview, and 2,848 marriages 
occurred at least 15 years prior to the time of the interview.  In each of these three subgroups, a 
probit of the incidence of divorce is explored to see to what degree economic conditions and 





Table 9: Probit of Divorce at Various Thresholds of Marriage Age 
Minimum length of marriage  
at time of interview 
5 years 
 Mean    St. Err. 
10 years 
 Mean    St. Err. 
15 years 
 Mean    St. Err. 
Unemployment at start of cohabitation 
Unemployment at the time of separation 
Age at the time of marriage 
Income level (by categorized variable) 
Intact family until the age of 18 
Mother has four-year college degree 
Father has four-year college degree 
Born into Catholic religion 
Born into Baptist religion 
Born into other Protestant religion 
Attended church at least monthly at 14 




















































































































Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
Note: Church attendance at age 14 was omitted from two regressions due to collinearity.   
 
In all three selections of marriage lengths, there is a positive relationship between poor economic 
conditions at the start of cohabitation and ultimate divorce.  This is consistent with recent 
advances in theory, suggesting that higher exit costs directly affect the decision of couples to 
escalate from dating to cohabitation to marriage (or directly to marriage), encouraging marriages 
that are of lower match quality.  This increases the likelihood that such marriages will end in 
divorce, as these data directly confirm.  Importantly, this is shown with the inclusion of a control 
variable for unemployment at the time of separation.  Again, the effect of marriage utility being 
shocked by unemployment suggests that higher unemployment is a driver to separate, which is 
demonstrated by the positive and significant relationship between unemployment at separation 
and divorce.  With this control in place, the separate effect of a poor economic condition at the 
time of cohabitation is shown separately as an ultimate driver of divorce.   
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One final test of economic conditions driving divorce involves investigating only premarital 
cohabitors.  I have demonstrated that premarital cohabitation does have an effect on marital 
success, but within this group, are exit costs as a driver to cohabitate having a separately 
identifiable effect on hazard rates?  A probit regression of the instance of divorce five years after 
marriage is offered, using only premarital cohabitors.  The results are shown in Table 10.   
 
Table 10: Probit of Divorce at Five years, Given Premarital Cohabitation 
 
 Mean      St. 
Err. 
 Mean      St. 
Err. 
 Mean      St. 
Err. 
Unemployment at start of cohabitation 
Unemployment at the time of separation 
Age at the time of marriage 
Income level (by categorized variable) 
Intact family until the age of 18 
Mother has four-year college degree 
Father has four-year college degree 
Born into Catholic religion 
Born into Baptist religion 
Born into other Protestant religion 
Attended church at least monthly at 14 









































































Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
Note: Church attendance at age 14 was omitted from two regressions due to collinearity.   
 
We can see immediately that divorce is significantly more likely among couples who began 
cohabiting at times of economic turmoil.  Again, unemployment at time of separation is 
controlled for to account for the "household disruption" effect.  Even when the stabilizing factor 
of age is accounted for, there is still a relatively large increase in the instance of divorce if higher 
exit costs and greater benefits of expense sharing are present when a couple begins cohabitation.   
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Question #4: When divorce is imminent, does cohabitation last significantly longer when exit 
costs are higher?   
 
A marriage that is doomed to fail would be part of a distribution of cohabitation end dates, which 
may respond to exit costs.  Higher exit costs should delay the end of cohabitation.  To measure 
this, the variable Stayed is created, which is the difference between the month of the end of 
cohabitation and the month of the end of the marriage (Stayed will therefore be negative for 
couples who end cohabitation prior to divorce).  If exit costs drive couples to live together 
longer, we might expect to see Stayed respond directly to higher exit costs at the end of the 
marriage.   
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Mother has four-year college degree 
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Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
Table 11 shows the results of this final regression.  While most control variables may not be 
appropriate in this setting, their presence does not detract away from the effect of economic 
conditions and the length of marriage on the timing of physical separation.  Marriages ending in 
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times of macroeconomic hardship see cohabitors living together longer than those couples 
separating in better times.  Shorter marriages are also shown to be associated with delayed 
physical separation.    
 
However, as with other analyses, there may well be other stories being told in the data that 
pervade.  For instance, if worsening economic conditions are the cause of added stress, job 
changes, etc. that precipitate a move by one of the cohabitors, it may affect cohabitation surplus.  
This is especially true considering that a proxy is used for this surplus.  Nonetheless, these data 
show that post-divorce cohabitation tends to show agreement between theory and empirics.   
 
3.5     Conclusion 
A recent theoretical paper has drawn attention to the potential role of exit costs in decisions to 
cohabitate, marry, and separate.  This paper uses changing unemployment rates as a broad proxy 
of changes in exit costs to test empirically some of the theoretical claims put forth.  I find that 
exit costs have a significant effect on decisions to cohabitate, marry, separate, and divorce.   
 
The regularity of the marriage hazard puzzle is obscured in the current dataset for short-term 
marriages.  Much stronger evidence of this puzzle is found with an examination of marital 
success at the 10-year mark.  Other authors have already noted the decline of this effect in more 
recent years, so the obscurity of the puzzle in the most recent marriages may indeed be a 
continuation of this trend.   
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The first question was whether we find evidence that changes in economic conditions affect the 
advent of cohabitation.  Changing economic conditions can affect union incentive through many 
channels, including expense sharing in cohabitation (whether marital or not), downside risk, 
diversification benefits, etc.  Using U.S. unemployment data as the proxy for changes in 
economic gains to cohabitation, there is strong evidence that worsening economic conditions do 
influence the timing of cohabitation and marriage.  Higher risk of job loss does appear to provide 
incentive for union formation, or forming them perhaps more quickly.   
 
Secondly, I explored whether exit costs significantly affect the choice of marriage or exit, once a 
couple reaches one of those decisions.  The length of cohabitation prior to marriage or separation 
was examined first, and a greater exit cost proxy was shown to reduce the length of premarital 
cohabitation, hurrying the couple along to marriage.  Paradoxically, an increase in exit costs over 
the course of the cohabitation also seemed to shorten the cohabitation length for couples that 
finally separated.  But the choice to marry or separate was also examined in Table 8, where an 
increase in exit costs was clearly associated with the decision to marry rather than to separate.   
 
Next, since exit costs do tend to push couples together in more economical living arrangements, 
including into marriage, what can we say about the relative strength of such marriages?  Are 
such marriages formed in these times of economic decline more subject to subsequent divorce?  
Yes.  In multiple groups, it appears clear that our exit cost proxy is related to divorce rates in a 
predictable fashion.  It is quite possible from the data that these marriages tend to provide lower 
utility to the pair, as marriages formed at times of pressure from higher exit costs are more likely 
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to eventually fail.  Also, a separate analysis of only premarital cohabitors showed that unions 
formed in poor economic climates are also more likely to end in separation.   
 
Finally, when divorce is imminent, cohabitations tend to last longer when exit costs are higher.  
This is shown with a generated variable of the number of months cohabitation of a couple lasts 
beyond the month in which they divorce.  Interestingly, the length of the marriage is negatively 
correlated with this variable.   
 
Throughout these analyses, control variables tell us of other interesting relationships that exist in 
the data.  Clearly a person's tendency to premaritally cohabitate, to marry, to separate, or to 
divorce, is influenced by the relationships that have been modeled to them by their parents, by 
religious affiliation, and a host of unobservable variables that remain unexplored.  Herein, exit 
costs, as proxied by U.S. national unemployment levels and changes, have been used as a 
correlate guide to the effect that exit costs may have on these decisions.   
 
One limitation of empirical work at this point is that a more direct and composite measure of exit 
costs remains unavailable.  It is unclear as to what the "best" measure of exit cost would be, as it 
can be interpreted as such a multifaceted concept as to defy practical measure.  Exit costs could 
be considered a measure of living costs, moving costs, transaction costs, psychological stresses, 
opportunity costs regarding other potential mates, matching costs, social pressures, etc.  We are 
far from constructing such a measure.  Marital satisfaction and utility are also missing variables 
in the NSFG dataset; and so, such implications of theory with regard to that are not testable.  
Even if that variable was collected, it would be arguably weakened by the fact that satisfaction is 
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known to change over the course of the relationship.  Limitations to empirical tests that may be 
addressed by more complete data in the future.  With these thoughts in mind, future research may 
be enhanced by survey modules in longitudinal surveys directly designed to measure several 
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